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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies the First World War South African campaign in German South West 
Africa from 1914 until 1915. The campaign was characterised by the high mobility of the 
Union’s mounted soldiers which enabled swift advances and rapid envelopments.  
 
The German forces applied a defensive strategy relying on the lack of water and remoteness 
of the terrain to deter and prolong the Union’s invasion. The German force also relied on 
internal lines of communication to concentrate its forces on the Union’s advancing columns.  
 
The Union Defence Forces’s numbered approximately 50 000 compared to the German 
force of about 7 000. The campaign culminated on 9 July 1915 with the surrender of almost 
the entire German fighting force intact.  
 
This study analyses whether the victory can be attributed to the Union Defence Forces’s 
numerical superiority or the operational strategy and tactics which were applied during the 
campaign. It is argued that this operational strategy is congruent with the modern theory of 
manoeuvre warfare and that the campaign is therefore a textbook example of manoeuvre 
warfare theory.  
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
        
The study of manoeuvre warfare theory received a great deal of international attention in the 
latter part of the 20th century and has thus influenced the study of military theory as a 
discipline from the 1980s until the present. This dissertation applies the framework of 
manoeuvre warfare theory to the South African campaign in German South West Africa 
during the First World War.1  
 
The dissertation deals with the dual aspects of military theory and historical study. The 
literature review (Chapter 2) systematically addresses manoeuvre warfare theory and the 
historiography of the campaign in two separate sections. The relevant literature on 
manoeuvre theory highlights the themes which are central to the manoeuvre theory 
framework applied in this study, including the means to defeat an enemy with the least 
resistance and material loss. The second part of the literature review addresses the 
historiography of the German South West African campaign and focuses on aspects of the 
campaign which bear similarities and congruency to what we today refer to as manoeuvre 
warfare. 
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory is a modern construct and the commanders of the campaign were 
not necessarily consciously executing manoeuvre warfare in the modern sense. The force 
groupings and their commanders applied their existing knowledge of warfare in an attempt to 
win the campaign in the most efficient manner. The campaign makes for an ideal case study 
of manoeuvre warfare theory with the advantage of hindsight.   
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory is discussed in Chapter 3. The fundamental elements of 
manoeuvre warfare theory are elaborated upon and combined into a framework. In Chapters 
4 to 8 the campaign is discussed in depth, detailing the course of events and analysing them 
with reference to the manoeuvre warfare theory framework.  
 
The dissertation hypothesises that the German South West African campaign provided the 
backdrop for a deliberate and effective display of manoeuvre warfare (or warfare concepts 
congruent to those of manoeuvre warfare theory) which resulted in victory with minimal loss 
of life and materiel.  
 
 
                                            
1  Note that German South West Africa was a German colony from 1884 until 1915. German 
South West Africa refers to the area that is modern day Namibia.  
2 
Background 
 
The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 as a dominion within the British Empire 
and Louis Botha became its first prime minister. The Union was inextricably linked to the 
global British wartime effort. The German South West African campaign involved the 
invasion of German South West Africa by South African forces as an extension of Britain’s 
military strategy in the First World War.  
 
The history of the formation of the Union of South Africa and the subsequent involvement in 
the German South West African campaign revolves around the two central and towering 
figures of Botha and Jan Christiaan Smuts. They were the leaders of the campaign and their 
military backgrounds, experience and abilities are important in the understanding of their 
position and approach towards the campaign.  
 
The broad political developments within South Africa at the time provide some insight into 
the rise to power of Botha and Smuts. This section outlines the general political 
developments in the Union of South Africa from the early 20th century until the formation of 
the Union Defence Forces in 1912. Furthermore, it provides an overview of the Afrikaner 
Rebellion and the German South West African campaign. Thereafter, manoeuvre warfare is 
discussed briefly with reference to its modern-day study, application and relevance within the 
military sphere. 
 
Prior to the formation of the Union of South Africa, Botha was a proponent of a united South 
Africa which he believed would only be possible through cooperation with the British 
Empire.2 During the South African War (1899–1902) Botha was initially a Boer3 commandant 
and subsequently became the commandant general of the Transvaal commandos in 1900 
after the death of Petrus Jacobus Joubert, the previous commandant general.  
 
Botha received much acclaim for successfully holding the defensive positions at the Tugela 
River on the Natal Front and for forcing the British forces to retreat after the Battles of 
Colenso and Spioen Kop.4 Botha’s military ability came to the fore during the conventional 
phase of the South African War but also extended to the guerrilla phase (March 1900 to May 
                                            
2  H.C. Armstrong, Grey Steel, J.C. Smuts: A Study in Arrogance (London: Arthur Barker, 1937), 
150. 
3  The term ‘Boer’ can be translated to mean ‘farmer’ in Afrikaans and was generally used to 
refer to members of the Afrikaner grouping. 
4  T. Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Abacus, 1979), 174; Armstrong, Grey Steel, 97. 
3 
1902) after the fall of Bloemfontein and Pretoria. After the war, Botha made large strides to 
reconcile the interests of English speakers and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans.  
 
Following the South African War, Botha and Smuts were included in the central committee of 
the Het Volk political party, which was formed in the Transvaal in 1904. Het Volk promoted 
Afrikaner interests but also focused on the reconciliation of all South Africans. Smuts put 
great effort into his proposal for the constitution of the Transvaal after which he devoted all 
his energies into the Transvaal election campaign.5 Their collaborative effort brought results 
when Botha was elected as the prime minister of the Transvaal and Smuts became the 
colonial secretary and minister of education in 1907.6  
 
Botha formed the South African Party together with Smuts, his friend, colleague and 
confidant. The South African Party aimed to unite the different white political parties in the 
four provinces with the objective of creating a Union. Smuts and Botha formed a strong 
partnership in politics. Botha had a charismatic personality; he was popular among his 
followers and inspired them with his magnanimity and optimism.7 
 
In contrast, Smuts was the quiet thinker, the intellectual of the partnership. A recipient of 
many academic awards, he graduated from Victoria College in Stellenbosch in 1891 and 
received a scholarship to attend Cambridge University where he graduated with top honours 
in 1893.8 Smuts then returned to South Africa where he pursued a career in law and 
politics.9 He was appointed as state attorney and aide-de-camp to President Stephanus 
Johannes Paulus Kruger of the ZAR in 1898, and headed a commando during the guerrilla 
phase of the South African War in 1901. Smuts is described as hard working with boundless 
energy.10  
 
Smuts worked vigorously towards a united South Africa and was responsible for compiling 
the framework for the Union of South Africa, which he put forward at the Intercolonial 
Conference in May 1908.11 The Union of South Africa was formed in May 1910 and formal 
elections were held in September of the same year. Botha became the first prime minister of 
                                            
5  W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel eds., Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume III 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 205. 
6  Armstrong, Grey Steel, 166. 
7  A. Lentin, Jan Smuts (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2010), 19. 
8  Armstrong, Grey Steel, 7. 
9  Ibid., 35, 36. 
10  Lentin, Jan Smuts, 23. 
11  Hancock and Van der Poel eds., Selections from the Smuts Papers, 331. 
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the Union of South Africa in 1910. Smuts was appointed as minister of mines, interior and 
defence.12  
 
The Defence Act of 1912 was the source of much discussion and debate in the parliament of 
the newly formed Union of South Africa.13 The turbulent past of the Union made matters of 
defence a prominent talking point. Following the formation of the Union of South Africa, the 
Defence Act was promulgated on 14 June 1912, which commissioned the formation of the 
Union Defence Forces.14  
 
Smuts was the minister of defence and was largely the architect of the Defence Act with the 
support of John Johnston Collyer and HRM Bourne, who was appointed undersecretary of 
defence.15 Collyer was a captain when the Defence Act was drawn up from 1910 until mid- 
1912. He subsequently became chief staff officer during the German South West African 
campaign, carrying the rank of lieutenant colonel. He eventually retired as a brigadier 
general and chief of general staff.  
 
The Botha government wanted a defence force that could defend the interests of the Union 
in any type or size of conflict.16 At its inception in 1910 the Union did not have a permanent 
national defence force because historically, each of the four provinces in the Union modelled 
its own particular style of defence as an independent outgrowth of its individual type of 
government. The Cape had a small permanent force, Natal had a militia-style force, while 
the Transvaal had a volunteer system, as did the Orange Free State. The Union Defence 
Forces was formed in 1912 and incorporated the military forces of the four provinces.17 
 
The Union Defence Forces comprised the Permanent Force; Active Citizen Force; Coast 
Garrison Force; Royal Naval Volunteers Reserve; and provision was also made in the 
Defence Act of 1912 for Special Reserve Units. The Union Defence Forces established the 
Permanent Force on 1 April 1914, which was known as the South African Mounted 
Riflemen.18   
                                            
12  Armstrong, Grey Steel, 201. 
13  W.A. Dorning, ‘A Concise History of the South African Defence Force 1912–1987’, Militaria, 
South African Journal for Military Studies, 17, 2 (1987), 2. 
14  A.C. Lillie, ‘The Origin and Development of the South African Army’, Militaria, South African 
Journal for Military Studies, 12, 2 (1982), 7. 
15  Dorning, ‘A Concise History’, 2. 
16  H. Strachan, The First World War, Vol 1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
547. 
17  J.J. Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915 (Pretoria: Government 
Printer, 1937), 13, 14. 
18  Lillie, ‘The Origin and Development of the South African Army’, 8–10. 
5 
 
The largest component of the Union Defence Forces was the Active Citizen Force which 
comprised many of the old commando units from the previous military establishments of the 
four provinces of the Union South Africa. The strength of the Active Citizen Force on 31 
December 1913 was 23 462.19 The Union Defence Forces had a total strength of 30 000 in 
early 1914.20   
 
The Union of South Africa found itself in a precarious position at the outbreak of the First 
World War. The Union Defence Forces was still in its developmental stage and was untested 
as a cohesive fighting force. The Union of South Africa was a dominion of Britain and when 
the British Empire declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, the Union of South Africa 
was in effect also at war with Germany.21 The British Empire requested the Union of South 
Africa to invade German South West Africa, capture its seaports and destroy its wireless 
communication stations. 
 
Botha and Smuts supported the British war effort but JBM. Hertzog contested the 
assumption that the association with the British Empire constituted an automatic involvement 
in the war.22 In parliament, as was the case in the population at large, there was support for 
and against the proposed invasion of German South West Africa. The Defence Act of 1912 
stipulated that members of the Union Defence Forces could only render defence in 
protection of the Union of South Africa.23 Accordingly, Botha motivated the invasion of 
German South West Africa as necessary in the defence of the Union. Botha’s motion for the 
invasion was passed in parliament on 10 September 1914 by 91 votes to ten.24 The Union 
officially entered the First World War on 14 September 1914.25 
 
By this time Britain was already engaged in warfare with the Germans on the Western Front 
in France. Britain mobilised its colonies and dominions because the international war effort 
required many troops and other resources. Furthermore, Britain wanted her international 
trade and control of the sea routes to be safeguarded. In this regard the Union of South 
                                            
19  Lillie, ‘The Origin and Development of the South African Army’, 10. 
20  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 16.  
21  R.J. Bouch, Infantry in South Africa (Pretoria: Documentation Service SADF, 1977). 
22  Strachan, The First World War, 545. 
23  Dorning, ‘A Concise History’, 4. 
24  Strachan, The First World War, 546; L’ange gives the final votes as 92 to 12 in favour of 
Botha: G. L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service (Rivonia: Ashanti, 1991), 17.  
25  I. Van der Waag, ‘The Battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914: South African Military 
Reform and the German South-West Africa Campaign, 1914–1915’, First World War Studies, 
4, 2 (2013), 3. 
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Africa played a key role in ensuring that the sea routes to the east via southern Africa were 
secured. 
 
Great Britain wanted the Union Defence Forces to take control of the ports of Lüderitzbucht 
and Swakopmund on the coast of German South West Africa, thus preventing Germany 
from using them to refuel, re-supply and repair German warships. In addition, the wireless 
stations in Windhoek, Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund, which were able to provide and 
maintain communications between Berlin and German warships at sea, had to be 
destroyed.26  
 
The plan devised for the South African campaign involved the amphibious landing of South 
African forces at Walvis Bay and Lüderitzbucht. Botha was in overall command of the 
operation and also took personal command of the northern operations which comprised a 
two-pronged easterly advance on the capital of Windhoek.  
 
The southern operations involved an easterly and subsequent northern drive from the Union 
force at Lüderitzbucht and a northerly cross-country advance from the forces south of the 
Kalahari Desert. The northern operations had the objective of the railhead at Karibib which 
led to the capital of Windhoek. The southern operation had the aim of concentrating on 
Keetmanshoop so as to restrict the movement of the German forces in the south. Karibib 
and Windhoek were captured on 6 and 12 May 1915 respectively. Botha then made a final 
drive to surround the German forces via Grootfontein and Tsumeb. The German force 
surrendered with its fighting capability almost completely intact on 9 July 1915.27    
 
At the beginning of the campaign the Union faced an internal threat in the form of the 1914 
Afrikaner Rebellion. This uprising was a manifestation of the dissatisfaction felt by many 
Afrikaners about the Union’s involvement in a “British” war at a time when anti-British 
sentiments were still very much in evidence in the aftermath of the South African War. 
Seeing this as an opportunity they could exploit, the Germans fomented rebellion by meeting 
with prominent republican-inclined Afrikaner military leaders who were heading the rebellion, 
such as Commandant SG Maritz and General CF Beyers.28 The Afrikaner Rebellion merged 
with the German South West African campaign in that it delayed the invasion plans. The 
                                            
26  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 7. 
27  Dorning, ‘A Concise History’, 4. 
28  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 5; B. Farwell, The Great 
War in Africa 1914–1918 (New York: Norton, 1986), 75. 
7 
Union Defence Forces first had to suppress the rebellion before commencing with the 
campaign.  
 
English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans had varying and layered feelings about the 
war. It is clear that in 1914 the Union of South Africa was by no means unified as a nation 
and there were differing beliefs and identities. There were many impoverished, barely literate 
Afrikaners who lived in rural areas who certainly did not identify with the British cause.29 
Apart from political differences, Afrikaner poverty and pre-disposition to rebel was also linked 
to the grave economic situation in the decades following the South African War.30 
 
The German complicity in the rebellion had implications in that Maritz did not support 
Colonel H Lukin (later Sir, Major General Lukin) at the Battle of Sandfontein. It is therefore 
argued that the rebellion was part of the German South West African campaign from a 
purely military point of view.  
 
Botha and Smuts acted decisively by utilising the Union Defence Forces to suppress the 
rebellion. The Botha government conceded lenient and conciliatory peace terms with the 
rebels at the culmination of the uprising between late 1914 and early 1915.31 The end of the 
rebellion allowed for the continuation of the German South West African campaign.32 
 
The German South West African campaign was unique in that it employed the Union 
Defence Forces for the first time in conventional warfare as an expeditionary force. At the 
beginning of the campaign the South African forces numbered approximately 50 000 
compared to the modest German force numbering about 7 000.33 The German forces (the 
Schutztruppe)34 adopted a defensive strategy from the outset. Their commander, Colonel J 
von Heydebreck hoped to make maximum use of the geography of the colony as well as the 
German internal lines of communication to delay the Union Defence Forces for as long as 
possible. In this way he hoped to prevent their redeployment to other theatres of the Great 
War.35  
 
Having dealt broadly above with the political developments in the Union of South Africa and 
the formation of the , and providing an overview of the Afrikaner Rebellion and its links with 
                                            
29  B. Nasson, Springboks on the Somme (Johannesburg: Penguin, 2007), 10. 
30  Van der Waag, ‘The Battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914’, 7. 
31  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 84. 
32  Dorning, ‘A Concise History’, 4. 
33  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 158. 
34  The Schutztruppe were the colonial forces of imperial Germany. 
35  Van der Waag, ‘The Battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914’, 3. 
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the German South West African campaign, this study now moves on to deal with the 
relevance of manoeuvre warfare theory in the present day and its application to the study of 
the German South West African campaign. 
 
The dissertation links the German South West African campaign to manoeuvre warfare 
theory. This theory aims at achieving the defeat of the enemy with the least effort and losses 
and in the shortest possible time. It places significant emphasis on mobility in forcing the 
enemy to surrender as opposed its complete destruction. The focus of manoeuvre warfare is 
on movement as opposed to firepower, with the objective of placing your opponent in an 
untenable situation which induces defeat.36  
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory is a contemporary theory which is applied to warfare in South 
Africa and internationally on the basis of its merit as an established approach to warfare.37 
The South African defence establishment (Union Defence Forces, South African Defence 
Force and South African National Defence Force) currently places great emphasis on the 
study of manoeuvre warfare and the application of its principles in warfare.38  
 
Attrition warfare theory emphasises firepower and the destruction of the enemy in pitched 
battle. This theory is the polar opposite of manoeuvre warfare theory which stresses 
movement and mobility to defeat the enemy.39   
 
In order to understand the reasons behind the South African victory in the German South 
West African campaign, the dissertation will examine whether the Union won because of 
superior numbers or because of its superior strategy and tactics. Thomas Richard Ungleich 
holds the opinion that the British and South African victory was a result of superior military 
numbers which resulted in the defeat of the Germans in a campaign which is often regarded 
as of little consequence in the broader picture of the First World War.40  
 
Ungleich’s version, which is the most recent pro-German secondary account of the 
campaign, argues that the South African numerical superiority forced the Germans to retreat 
                                            
36  Chapter 2 will place manoeuvre warfare theory in context for this dissertation. The framework 
for manoeuvre warfare theory will be explained in Chapter 3. 
37  British Army, Operations, British Army Doctrine (Andover: Army Publications, 2010), iii; South 
African Army College, Operational Concepts: Staff Officer’s Operational Manual, Part VII 
(Pretoria: 1 Military Printing Regiment, 1996), 7/6-1. 
38  South African Army College, Operational Concepts, 7/5-4. 
39  Attrition and manoeuvre warfare theory will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
40  T.R. Ungleich, ‘The Defence of German South West Africa during World War I’ (MA thesis, 
University of Miami, Miami, 1974), 205. 
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time and again, after which they made their last stand in the northeast of the colony.41 On 
the issue of numerical superiority David Killingray feels that it was a central factor in the 
defeat of the Germans.42 Jan Christiaan Smuts junior, the son of General Smuts, claims ‘the 
victory was due to superior tactics as well as overwhelming strength’.43 Did superior 
numbers and direct attack ensure the victory over the German forces, or was the victory the 
result of superior tactics and operational strategy? This question is basic to the analysis of 
the German South West African campaign in this study.   
 
The dissertation proposes that the application of manoeuvre warfare theory resulted in the 
success of the campaign and that the numerical superiority of the Union Defence Forces 
was not the most overwhelming factor in the victory. Essentially, it argues that the German 
South West African campaign is a text book example of manoeuvre warfare theory. 
 
The use of theory in this dissertation is intended to compare historical events within the 
framework of manoeuvre theory; to determine how the military campaign was conducted; 
and ultimately, how victory was attained. This analysis is designed to add value to the 
existing body of military knowledge where the corporate knowledge and understanding of 
military officers is based on military history.  
 
The study of the German South West African campaign and the military action during the 
Afrikaner Rebellion allows for the exploration of the first campaign conducted by the Union 
Defence Forces. The analysis of the campaign as an example of manoeuvre warfare 
provides the opportunity to overlay contemporary theoretical concepts and frameworks to the 
study of the German South West African campaign. Furthermore, the research is largely 
directed at military scholars and students of war to further the knowledge and art of the 
profession of arms.  
 
In terms of military theory, the topic of the South African campaign in German South West 
Africa is not well covered. The dissertation therefore aims to analyse the campaign with 
reference to military theory. It provides an account of the course of events and analysis of 
the German South West African campaign in Chapters 4 to 8. The results of this analysis 
add value to the study of the German South West African campaign with reference to its 
                                            
41  Ibid., 52. 
42  D. Killingray, ‘The War in Africa’, Chapter 7 in H. Strachan,ed., The Oxford Illustrated History 
of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 93. 
43  J.C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts (London: Cassell, 1952), 259. 
10 
relation to military theory. Chapter 9 includes the final analysis of the campaign and Chapter 
10 concludes the dissertation. 
 
The importance of the African campaigns in the First World War remains largely 
overshadowed by the European theatre of operations. Killingray maintains that the German 
South West African campaign and other campaigns in Africa, were merely ‘sideshows’ of the 
First World War.44 Collyer agrees that in general the campaigns in Africa were minor in 
comparison to the European theatre of war, but feels that the campaign in German South 
West Africa holds particular interest because it provided the first test of the Union Defence 
Forces since its formation under the Defence Act in 1912.45  
 
In terms of justification of the study of a given topic, John Tosh says that a historian ‘is 
completely justified in allowing current social concerns to affect his or her choice’.46 There is 
a focus on manoeuvre warfare theory in the South African National Defence Force at 
present. Needless to say, the study of manoeuvre warfare theory in the South African 
context requires a study of South Africa’s past military campaigns. EH Carr states that 
history is ‘an unending dialogue between the past and the present’.47 The present 
determines needs and new analysis of the past. The German South West African campaign 
thus provides an interesting case study for manoeuvre warfare theory. 
 
The study of military history gives commanders and staff officers as well as other ranks, an 
understanding of past wars, campaigns and operations. BH Liddell Hart writes that for a 
soldier there is direct and indirect experience (through study); direct experience may be 
limited, whereas indirect experience may be deeper and may assist with the mental 
preparation of soldiers.48  
                                            
44  Killingray, ‘The War in Africa’, 92. 
45  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 1. 
46  J. Tosh and S. Lang, The Pursuit of History (London: Pearson Longman, 2006), 214–218. 
47  Ibid, x. 
48  B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy of the Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1941), 2. 
 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Manoeuvre Warfare Theory 
 
The study of warfare theory encompasses the competing theories of manoeuvre and attrition 
theory. Neither of these two theories is mutually exclusive and wars are a combination to 
differing extents of these two approaches.1 It is argued in this dissertation that manoeuvre 
warfare theory is an effective and efficient means of analysing and conducting war.  
 
Manoeuvre theory is derived from military history and military strategies which have been 
employed in past campaigns. This theory of warfare resurfaced as a field of study in the late 
1970s after initially receiving much attention from the 1920s until the 1940s.  
 
Colonel John Boyd proposed that a study of warfare should follow what he called the OODA 
cycle, namely: observation, orientation, decision, and action (also called the OODA loop). 
Boyd’s theories influenced manoeuvre warfare theory in that a rapid decision-making cycle 
was essential for victory. Boyd based his theories on his experience as a fighter pilot and by 
conducting interviews with veteran commanders about their war experiences. Boyd also 
read widely on military history and drew on the experiences and lessons of past campaigns. 
 
Boyd wrote an essay in 1976 entitled ‘Destruction and Creation’, and gave a slide 
presentation which he named ‘New Conception for Air-to-Air Combat’ in which he alluded to 
some of the aspects which would become fundamental in the conceptualisation of the OODA 
cycle. He proposed that confusion or entropy affects the ability of commanders to take 
decisions and thus take action.2 The inability to make the correct decision in time, results in 
the incorrect action being taken which is central to losing a battle or an operation.  
 
Boyd gave further presentations from 1986 until 1996, by which time the OODA cycle theory 
was fully developed. These presentations promoted his OODA loop theory which further 
influenced manoeuvre warfare theory.3 
 
                                            
1  J.A. Springman, ‘The Rapier or the Club: The Relationship between Attrition and Manoeuvre 
Warfare’ (MSS thesis, United States Army War College, Carlisle, 2006), 1.  
2  J.R. Boyd, ‘Destruction and Creation’, Unpublished essay, September 1976.  
3  W.S. Angerman, ‘Coming Full Circle with Boyd’s OODA Loop Ideas: An Analysis of 
Innovation Diffusion and Evolution’ (MSMIS thesis, United States Air Force Institute of 
Technology, Dayton, 2004), 16. 
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The 1980s and 1990s saw a range of authors coming to the fore and elaborating on 
manoeuvre warfare theory. The framework which will be applied in this dissertation is 
derived largely from the works of William Lind, Richard Simpkin and Robert Leonhard.4 The 
research and findings of these three authors have much in common. Leonhard explains that 
‘the highest and purest form of manoeuvre warfare is to pre-empt the enemy that is to 
disarm or neutralise him before the fight’.5  
 
Within the framework of manoeuvre warfare theory Simpkin identifies dislocation and pre-
emption as possible methods of attaining victory, where dislocation refers to the application 
of manoeuvre once conflict has broken out; and where pre-emption refers to the use of 
manoeuvre to prevent the outbreak of combat.6  
 
Manoeuvre warfare is linked to a rapid decision-making cycle, lower level command initiative 
and a decentralised command system. Lind discusses the aspect of decentralisation of 
military forces and comments that the decision making cycle of a given military force must be 
done at a pace that is faster than that of the enemy and that this must be done by the 
respective decentralised forces.7 A rapid decision-making cycle relates to pre-emption and 
dislocation of the enemy. 
 
Leonhard builds on the theory as set out by Lind and Simpkin taking into account the study 
of warfare on the continuum between attrition and manoeuvre theory. Leonhard describes 
attrition as the way of defeating an enemy force in war, campaign or battle through 
destruction of the enemy’s mass.8  
 
Attrition theory emphasises destroying the enemy in a pitched battle in the hope that the 
damage done by one’s own force on the enemy outweighs the relative attack of the enemy. 
The South African Army staff officer’s reference manual explains that attrition theory is 
analogous to positional theory and strives to inflict casualties and material losses.9 Leonhard 
describes ‘an immovable focus on attrition theory … aimed at destroying rather than 
                                            
4  R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (New York: Ballantine, 1994); W.S. Lind, Manoeuvre 
Warfare Handbook (London: Westview Press, 1985); R.E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift 
(London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers,1986). 
5  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 19. 
6  Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 140. 
7  Lind, Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook, 6. 
8  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 19. 
9  South African Army College, Operational Concepts, 7/3-1.  
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defeating, at fighting fairly rather than stealing every advantage over the enemy, and at 
pursuing perfection in method rather than obtaining decisive results’.10   
 
Attrition differs from manoeuvre theory in terms of its focus on destruction as opposed to the 
defeat of the enemy through pre-emption, disruption or dislocation. Manoeuvre warfare 
theory emphasises the importance of movement, envelopment and placement of forces over 
firepower and destruction which is epitomised in attrition warfare theory. Manoeuvre theory 
is thus focused on the dislocation or pre-emption of forces as opposed to an overwhelming 
focus on firepower in pitched battle. The use of superior firepower and technology is directly 
related to the employment of attrition theory.11 
 
The difference between manoeuvre and attrition theory can be divided into a focus on the 
human element of war and a focus on the technological aspect of war respectively. The 
debate on whether the most influential element in warfare is firepower or manoeuvre 
remains undecided. This dissertation takes the point of view that manoeuvre warfare theory 
is of central importance in the conduct of war.  
 
Abel Esterhuyse analyses the relation between manoeuvre and attrition theory on the 
various levels of war (refer to Figure 1)12 and highlights the point that despite the difference 
in theoretical underpinnings, all wars include some level of attrition.13 There is a definite and 
continuous relation between attrition and manoeuvre warfare theory in the conduct of war. 
Manoeuvre theory is an ideal in military theoretical terms which aims at victory in the 
shortest possible time with minimal loss of life and materiel.  
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of the levels of war  
                                            
10  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 4. 
11  A. Esterhuyse, ‘The Theories of Attrition versus Manoeuvre and the Levels of War’, Strategic 
Review for Southern Africa, 23, 2 (2001), 86. 
12  The levels of war include the strategic, operational and tactical. 
13  Esterhuyse, ‘The Theories of Attrition versus Manoeuvre’, 87. 
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Liddell Hart served on the Western Front during the First World War and after the war, he 
wrote extensively on mechanisation and the use of armoured warfare. He formulated what 
he referred to as the indirect approach. His theory of indirect approach expounds the 
importance of avoiding direct attack on enemy defensive positions in favour of an enveloping 
or surprise attack.14  
 
Bjorn Solberg applies the indirect approach as alluded to by Liddell Hart in his study on the 
importance of manoeuvre warfare and its application to the Norwegian infantry. Solberg 
maintains that divergent lines of operation and deep enveloping movements that create a 
feeling of being trapped, lead to paralysis and psychological dislocation.15 The indirect 
approach aims to dislocate the psychological and physical dimensions of the enemy on a 
continuous basis. Manoeuvre warfare thus attempts to pre-empt or defeat the enemy by 
disrupting its psychological and physical capability.16  
 
Modern military theorists have relied on the work of Liddell Hart to explain the relation 
between military theory and psychology. Manoeuvre warfare incorporates psychology into its 
framework which includes aspects such as morale, frustration and fear and how these 
factors influence the outcome of battles and operations.17  
 
The focus of manoeuvre theory is on the human condition. Liddell Hart was central in 
introducing the aspects of the human condition into contemporary military theory. He 
deliberates on the primary, yet incalculable element of war, the human will and how aspects 
of movement and surprise can dislocate the physical and psychological capability of the 
enemy, elements that are fundamental to combat cohesion.18 An attack on the enemy 
should ideally have two psychological effects, namely: firstly, to destroy the enemy’s will to 
resist and secondly, to destroy the enemy’s cohesion.19 
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory focuses on the psychological impact of making the enemy force 
lose its morale, which results in the enemy fleeing. Intrinsically coupled with the concepts of 
                                            
14  Liddell Hart, Strategy of the Indirect Approach. 
15  B.T. Solberg, ‘Maneuver Warfare: Consequences for Tactics and Organisation of the 
Norwegian Infantry’ (MMAS thesis, United States Army Command and Staff College, Kansas, 
2000), 30, 31. 
16  South African Army College, Operational Concepts, 7/5-4. 
17  B. Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat (New York: Praeger, 1988); R. Gal and 
D.A. Mangelsdorff eds., Handbook of Military Psychology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1991); B. Glad ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (London: Sage, 1990). 
18  B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber & Faber, 1967). 
19  South African Army College, Operational Concepts, 7/5-5. 
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loss of morale and fleeing is the pursuit of the enemy.20 Manoeuvre warfare theory holds that 
the loss of morale is related to the defeat of the enemy. Furthermore, manoeuvre theory 
evaluates the human condition in combat as opposed to a strict analysis of troop numbers, 
capabilities and military equipment. Don Starry, who was a four-star general in the United 
States Army, comments that the outcome of battles is often decided by factors other than 
numerical superiority.21  
 
There were very few military theorists who addressed the psychology of warfare before Hart. 
In the Western military tradition one such military theorist was Ardant Du Picq. Du Picq 
promulgated theories on the study of morale and unit cohesion in combat. He linked the 
impact of weapons to the morale of the enemy as opposed purely to the destruction of the 
enemy’s military hardware. Du Picq states, ‘in studying ancient combats, it can be seen that 
it was almost always an attack from the flank or rear, a surprise action that won battles, 
especially against the Romans’.22  
 
Martin van Creveld reinforces the previous point by commenting that from the time of 
Napoleon Bonaparte in the late 18th century to Helmuth von Moltke, Alfred von Schlieffen 
and Liddell Hart in the early 20th century, the object of battle has been to outflank the 
opponent so as to envelop and encircle the enemy force and ensure that it is cut off from its 
logistical supplies. This will result in victory in the battle and possibly the campaign as well. 
The use of this method is tacitly or explicitly understood as the means of gaining victory in a 
confrontation between conventional military forces – as was the case in Ulm in 1805 
(Napoleon and the French army effectively surrounded and cut off the Austrian army forcing 
it to surrender) and is accepted as a convention of war where the encircled army accepts 
defeat when cut off.23 
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory aims to dislocate or pre-empt the enemy by enveloping or cutting 
him off. The principles of manoeuvre warfare are largely congruent with the principles 
expressed by Sun Tzu.24 Sun claims that supreme excellence lies not in winning of every 
                                            
20  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 112. 
21  Simpkin, Race to the Swift, x. 
22  A. du Picq, trs., J.N. Greenly and R.C. Cotton, Battle Studies,http://www.gutenberg.org/files-
h.htm, ebook (Accessed 23 Janaury 2012), 55. 
23  M. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 91. 
24  Sun Tzu was a Chinese general and military theorist in ancient times, who introduced 
prominent concepts such as deception, surprise and the importance of morale to military 
theory over 2 000 years ago. His treatise on military theory has been translated into English 
among other languages and is accepted in the Western military tradition. 
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battle but rather in defeating the enemy without resistance.25 Manoeuvre warfare theory and 
Sun’s theory hold the same central tenet.26 Sun’s theory on warfare is expounded by Liddell 
Hart in his indirect approach, which has similar elements to manoeuvre warfare.27 
 
In order for military history to have a practical purpose, its study should result in the 
formation of principles and theories. Principles are classified as laws which are based on 
what has been observed, while theories involve the analysis of history in order to be better 
equipped to determine how a system should function.28 Manoeuvre has in recent times been 
adopted as a theory of warfare and a principle of war in the South African National Defence 
Force. Manoeuvre is defined as, ‘a fundamental truth regarding the prosecution of war … the 
object is to dispose a force in such a manner as to place the enemy at a relative 
disadvantage and achieve results that would otherwise be costly in men and materiel’.29  
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory and military theory as a whole, were influenced by the works of 
the mid-19th century theorists of war such as Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henry 
Jomini. Clausewitz coined the term centre of gravity as the hub of all power30 and he also 
commented on the friction of warfare which affects the psychology of the combatants and 
commanders.31 Jomini spoke of lines of advance and attack on key points with the 
placement of an overwhelming force so as to achieve an objective.32  
 
The theoretical underpinnings of the indirect approach as postulated by Liddell Hart are 
hypothetically superimposed on the divergent advances of a military force on a central 
objective or through divergent advances on successive decisive points en route to the centre 
of gravity. Liddell Hart referred to attacking along the line of least expectation and the line of 
least resistance,33 and this idea can be achieved through the consideration of the lines of 
advance in operations and the decisive points of the opposing force.34  
 
                                            
25  T. Sun, tr., L Giles, The Art of War, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/132/132.txt, ebook, 
Accessed 23 January 2012, 4. 
26  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 28. 
27  South African Army College, Operational Concepts, 7/3-1. 
28  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 78, 79. 
29  South African National Defence Force, ‘The Principles of War’, South African Military History 
Reader (Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, 2004), 40. 
30  The ‘centre of gravity’ is a philosophical abstract in military theory which must be analysed 
and identified by real time commanders in the execution of operational planning. The centre 
of gravity is the objective of an attack, advance or the positioning of forces.  
31  C. von Clausewitz, tr., J.J. Graham, On War, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-
h/1946-h.htm, ebook, Accessed 23 January 2012, 119. 
32  A.H. Jomini, tr., G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill, The Art of War (Rockville: Art Manor, 2007). 
33  Liddell Hart, Strategy, 335. 
34  Solberg, ‘Maneuver Warfare’, 29. 
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Manoeuvre theory adapted the term ‘centre of gravity’ and describes it as the critical 
vulnerability. In its original context, as put forward by Clausewitz, the centre of gravity refers 
to the hub of power and the concentration of strength of the enemy. Manoeuvre warfare 
theory adapted this concept to refer to the critical vulnerability, which if compromised leads 
to the paralysis of the enemy and not just a reduction of the enemy’s military capabilities.35  
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory is a theory of military strategy and is included in the military 
strategic framework.36 The strategic framework is the link between politics, the military and 
the different levels of war. The levels of war provide the construct that enable an 
understanding of the conceptual and physical requirements of military activities and theory.37 
 
Thomas Edward Lawrence, or Lawrence of Arabia as he was known, wrote that the purpose 
of tactics is to achieve strategic ends.38 Strategy aims to achieve political and national 
objectives through military means. Between the strategic level of war and the tactical level of 
war there is the operational level of war. The operational level consists of the overall conduct 
of campaigns whereas the tactical level is specifically concerned with battles.39 
 
Campaigns are fought at the operational level of war which links the strategic objectives to 
military actions at the tactical level. Paul Montanus links the study of manoeuvre warfare to 
the Saratoga campaign during the American War of Independence. The Saratoga campaign 
was analysed in terms of the manoeuvre concepts of movement, placement of forces and 
seeking of gaps in defensive lines.40  
 
This dissertation follows a similar pattern and applies the national character of the Union 
Defence ForceUnion Defence Forces and the manner in which the commanders influenced 
and shaped the campaign with the forces available to them. 
 
                                            
35  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 44. 
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The study of manoeuvre warfare theory as a military theory and military strategy are 
fundamentally interlinked because they aim to explain the nature and application of the 
military. The study of theory and strategy in history allows for the re-analysis of historical 
military campaigns and sheds new light on them. Ken Booth comments that there is much to 
be gained from strategic history.41  
 
The reasons behind the victory gained by the Union Defence Forces are intrinsically linked 
to the reasons for the defeat suffered by the German forces in German South West Africa. 
The causes of victory and defeat are by their nature complex and are often oversimplified for 
varying reasons – often these stem from an inaccurately applied methodology. The German 
defeat will be analysed by using the relevant parts of the theories expounded by EA Cohen 
and J Gooch42 as well as that put forward by MI Handel.43 These authors explore the causes 
of defeat relative to organisational factors as well as tangible and intangible aspects which 
influence the outcome of battles and campaigns.  
 
Gooch and Cohen have devised a methodology for analysing defeat which requires one to 
determine the cause of the military failure (from the German perspective) followed by 
determining the critical lapses or tasks which were not completed and thus led to the defeat. 
The third step is to do a layered analysis which includes investigating some of the 
organisational aspects which led to failure.44  
 
Handel identifies a formula to determine total military power (refer to Figure 2). This equation 
is used in the analysis of the German South West African campaign when comparing the 
Union Defence Forces and the German force. 
 
Total Military Power = Quantity x Materiel Quality x Non-Material Quality 
Figure 2: Formula for total military power45 
 
The quantitative elements are the numbers of soldiers and military equipment. Materiel 
quality refers to whether the equipment used by a given military is of a good standard and 
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The Free Press, 1990). 
43  M.I. Handel, War Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989). 
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non-material quality refers to the intangibles of military forces such as morale, motivation, 
level of training, doctrine, staff work and organisation.46 
 
This dissertation analyses the German South West African campaign from a strategic 
historical perspective through the lens of manoeuvre warfare theory. The framework for 
manoeuvre warfare theory for the purposes of this dissertation is outlined in Chapter 3. The 
main elements of manoeuvre theory will be identified and discussed with reference to the 
course of events of the German South West African campaign.  
 
German South West African Campaign 
 
The ‘Official History of the German South West African Campaign’ is a chapter in a collected 
work, Union of South Africa and the Great War, 1914–1918: Official History, and is the first 
major account of the campaign, principally compiled by Johan Leipoldt. Ian van der Waag 
comments that there were many other contributing authors and editors of the Official History 
which is the reason why it was published anonymously in 1924.47 The chapter on the 
German South West African campaign gives a descriptive account of the military operations 
and illuminates the strategic and tactical advantages and disadvantages of the Union 
Defence Forces during the campaign. The Official History is by its nature biased and gives 
an account from the South African point of view. 
 
John Johnston Collyer who was the chief staff officer during the German South West African 
campaign recounted the events of the campaign in his book which was published in 1936.48 
Collyer’s book has many similarities to the Official History. Collyer stressed the South African 
national system of tactics,49 the command style of Botha, which he claims was uniquely 
suited for the campaign, as well as the difficulties of not having an efficient staff system to 
keep the military force well supplied and maintained.  
 
Collyer’s book is biased towards South African interest and was edited by a committee 
appointed by the Union Defence Forces.50 The Official History and Collyer’s account 
                                            
46  Handel, War Strategy and Intelligence, 96. 
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describe the campaign in a holistic fashion making reference to the strategic, operational 
and tactical levels of war. The Official History and Collyer’s The Campaign in German South 
West Africa, 1914–1915 have not yet been surpassed in their description and analysis of the 
campaign. 
 
Collyer dedicates large portions of his work to the analysis of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the German and South African forces and the strategies and tactics 
employed by both sides. Whereas the South African force had the numerical superiority, 
Collyer indicates some of the military advantages which the Germans had over the South 
Africans, including an undivided command; a conventionally trained, homogeneous force; 
superior artillery; and good logistics, which included a well-structured rail system.51  
 
The campaign began with a loss for the Union Defence Forces in September 1914 at the 
Battle of Sandfontein, which characterises the German military advantages mentioned by 
Collyer. The Germans managed to concentrate superior forces at Sandfontein which caught 
the South African forces by surprise. The defeat at Sandfontein is discussed in Collyer’s 
book and is largely attributed to the delay in receiving intelligence on the massing of German 
troops in and around Sandfontein. There is a growing body of literature on the Battle of 
Sandfontein and its impact on the Union Defence Forces.52  
 
The Battle of Sandfontein coincided with undertones of rebellion throughout the Union. A 
number of disgruntled prominent officers of the Union Defence Forces and their followers 
met with German agents to discuss the possibility of initiating rebellion in the Union of South 
Africa. The German authorities used the Afrikaner Rebellion as a means of delaying the 
commencement of the invasion of German South West Africa. The subsequent outbreak of 
the Afrikaner Rebellion resulted in a brief halt to the operations in German South West Africa 
because the Union Defence Forces was first used to put down the rebellion. Operations in 
German South West Africa resumed once the rebellion was effectively quelled.53  
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Many of the sources used in this dissertation are derived from pro-South African sources 
and most of them have similarities in their description of events. Prior to the publishing of the 
Official History and Collyer’s account of the campaign, many books on the campaign were 
released. These books provide firsthand accounts and describe the events of the campaign 
in a rather limited way. They do, however, give insight into the personal experiences of the 
authors on the different operations in the north and the south of German South West Africa. 
 
The broad description of the campaign centres around the Northern Force which landed 
amphibiously in Walvis Bay; the Central Force which advanced from Lüderitzbucht after 
being deployed by sea; and the Southern Force and Eastern Force both of which advanced 
cross-country via the border between the Union and German South West Africa. The 
Central, Eastern and Southern forces combined later in the campaign to form the Southern 
Army. 
 
WW O’Shaughnessy was a Reuter's special war correspondent on the campaign and he 
captured the story of the campaign in his book which he co-authored with WS Rayner.54 The 
two authors discuss operations in German South West Africa, illuminating issues such as the 
state of morale among the soldiers – which was high during times of advance and attack – 
and the force composition of the South African and German forces. Their account does give 
some insight into the day-to-day experiences of the Northern Force as well as a broad 
overview of the Union Defence Forces’s invasion plans which includes the amphibious 
landings at Lüderitzbucht and Walvis Bay and the cross-border advance by the Eastern and 
Central forces. Their account also discusses the novel use of aeroplanes in the campaign. 
 
Later authors covered the aspect of aeroplanes in the German South West African campaign 
to some extent.55 The South African and the German military forces made use of aeroplanes 
for aerial reconnaissance and also carried out a primitive form of aerial bombardment. The 
use of aerial reconnaissance was of great importance to the Union Defence Forces during 
the final advances and envelopments of the German forces. 
 
The northern operation from Walvis Bay eastwards towards Windhoek was led by Botha 
personally. This advance was the main thrust of the campaign and was characterised by 
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definite periods of waiting and advances set apart by bursts of high mobility. The first 
offensive of the Northern Force was taken against the German defensive line between Riet, 
Pforte and Jakkalsfontein. Mobility and a rapid advance were essential in catching the 
Germans off guard. The speed of advance gave the Germans little time to finalise their 
defensive plans. 
 
The focus on mobility and surprise becomes a recurring theme when one explores the 
firsthand accounts of the campaign. Moore Ritchie was a member of Botha’s bodyguard unit, 
comprised for the most part by the South African Police. Ritchie writes: ‘When General 
Botha treks he treks at express speed. With him the intention is that the essence of strategy 
shall be surprise.’56 Ritchie was involved in the northern operation and alludes to the rapidity 
of the marches and then the long periods of rest and recuperation. 
 
HF Trew, who was the commander of Botha’s bodyguard, describes his experience in the 
northern operations of the campaign and gives his opinion on Botha’s military strategy. Trew 
points out that Botha emphasised the importance of secrecy of his movements, mobility and 
the element of surprise.57  
 
The rapidity of the northern operations was demonstrated during the advance on the 
defensive position at Riet in March 1915 which was the first major objective of the northern 
advance. Botha employed a rapid night march to get into position for the attack on the 
German defensive position. Botha’s bodyguard was closely engaged in the fighting at Riet 
and they were applied as a reserve force for the fighting detachments. 
 
Trew’s account has similarities to Moore’s version of the campaign. Many of the authors who 
published in the early years after the campaign have much overlap in their account of 
events. The emphasis on mobility and pushing the horses to their limit comes through very 
strongly. The availability of water is also given great emphasis because the campaign was 
fundamentally influenced by the geographic location of watering holes.  
 
Trew spent a considerable amount of time with Botha during the campaign and 
accompanied him until the German surrender. Trew brings forward Botha’s knowledge of 
warfare in his understanding of the power of mobility and envelopment. Botha’s use of 
envelopments became his signature tactic during the campaign and was used to great effect 
against the Riet defensive line to ensure the German withdrawal. Trew goes on to claim that 
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Botha’s knowledge of the double envelopment was learnt from his experience during the 
Boers’ confrontations with the Zulu people.58 
 
Following the victory at the Riet defensive line, the South African forces had a strong 
foothold in the north of German South West Africa. The German forces attempted an attack 
on Trekkoppies in April 1915 to stifle the South African advance. 
 
W Whittal was a British lieutenant commander in command of the Number 1 Royal 
Armoured Car Squadron deployed from the British Navy. The armoured cars supported the 
northern operations of the campaign and were effectively used in the action at Trekkoppies.  
 
Whittal describes the battle at Trekkoppies and how the armoured cars helped the Union 
Defence Forces achieve victory on that particular occasion. In terms of the overall strategic 
picture the German attack on Trekkoppies had little impact; it coincided with the Union 
Defence Forces’s advance on Karibib and Windhoek from Riet.  
 
Whittal goes on to discuss the general state of morale of the troops as well as the objectives 
of Botha and the Union Defence Forces’s military strategy, the lines of advance and the 
intent to cut off of the German force. With each South African advance the Germans were 
pushed further and further back. When the South Africans advanced and captured Karibib 
which was a strategic railway junction in the north, they effectively removed the German’s 
freedom of movement and ability to mass troops and supplies throughout the colony. Karibib 
and Windhoek were captured in May 1915. 
 
Whittal held Botha’s abilities as a general in very high regard and admired his interpersonal 
skills which are personified in Whittal’s statement that Botha’s personal magnetism, 
charisma and directness was well used to motivate the soldiers in the German South West 
African campaign.59 The soldiers on campaign were often bored and frustrated by the 
apparent lack of action and the long periods of inactivity between advances. The advances 
were dependent on resources which were not always readily available.  
 
Underlying the frustrations of regimental life on campaign, the Union Defence Forces also 
reflected the animosities present in the Union of South Africa. The Union was newly formed 
and there were still political, social and economic tensions and insecurities in the various 
provinces and sectors.  
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Botha’s influence was needed in the campaign to calm the tensions in the Union Defence 
Forces. It had become an organisation that was marred by competing interests and military 
cultures.60 In many ways it reflected the military cultures of conventional military units which 
were based on the British organisational model and that of the commandos which was 
based on the Afrikaner method of warfare. However, these differences in approach, military 
culture and interests did not affect the outcome of operations. There were certainly 
disagreements and problems in attaining resources and logistics, but the outcome of 
operations was never compromised by internal tensions.  
 
In his book, HFB Walker discusses the logistical constraints and the ability of the different 
forces to pull together to cover extensive distances at a rapid pace and achieve their often 
daunting objectives. Walker’s firsthand account of the campaign focuses on his individual 
experiences as a doctor attached to the Northern Force. Walker also discusses the pressure 
placed on the medical support to move at a speed which was proportional to that of the 
advancing forces.61  
 
The final advance and envelopment occurred in the north because the Germans had 
effectively retreated to the end of their logistical and railway lines. The Union Defence 
Forces executed extensive marches with minimal logistical support and was able to surround 
the German force and compel their surrender in July 1915. 
 
The northern and the southern operations took place simultaneously and formed a 
coordinated effort to defeat the German forces. The southern operations involved the 
capture of the southern half of German South West Africa which culminated in the taking of 
Gibeon.  
 
The operations in the south began with the advance of the Central Force from Lüderitzbucht 
and the cross-border advance of the Southern and Eastern forces from the Union of South 
Africa. These three forces amalgamated under the command of Smuts in April 1915.  
 
Several authors such as DE Reitz and PJK Robinson describe their experiences as part of 
the Southern Force.62 The southern operations did not see as much action at the northern 
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operations. Lüderitzbucht was taken unopposed and there were several small skirmishes en 
route to Aus which was evacuated by the Germans in late March 1915.  
 
Robinson served with the Imperial Light Horse Regiment. He alludes to his experience in the 
campaign as part of the southern force which included his unit’s advance from Lüderitzbucht 
to Gibeon. Robinson gives the reader an idea of the boredom and frustration experienced by 
the soldiers on the German South West African campaign. 
 
The Central Force spent an extended period at Lüderitzbucht waiting for supplies and for the 
commencement of its operations. These inactive periods were alternated by sudden, rapid 
advances. The firsthand accounts depict this disparity well. There was often very little 
warning between the boredom of waiting and the sudden switch to full-scale operations from 
a state of virtual inertia.  
 
The campaign consisted of considerably more movement than pitched battle and Robinson 
comments: ‘We always seemed to be playing on the fringes of war, a sort of appetiser before 
the dinner that we were never really to taste.’63 The views of Robinson are focused on his 
military unit and its individual actions. They provide insight into the day-to-day operations of 
the Southern Force in German South West Africa. The strategic and operational level 
required the Germans to be pushed out of the south so that they could be effectively 
surrounded in the north. The final operation in the south was the advance and capture of 
Gibeon in April 1915. Following the Battle of Gibeon the Southern Force was largely 
disbanded or redeployed to the north. 
 
The firsthand accounts hold value in that they address the detail of the campaign. These 
accounts of the southern operations indicate the boredom during the time spent waiting for 
supplies; the problems in receiving sufficient water; and the desire to engage in battle. These 
accounts discuss such matters from an individual point of view. They link in well with 
secondary sources, text books and academic articles which have been published on the 
First World War with the advantage of hindsight.  
 
Many of the firsthand accounts of the German South West African campaign corroborate the 
wider issues of the campaign such as the importance of water; the necessity of keeping the 
mounted soldiers mobile in terms of logistics; and the tactics and strategy employed to 
induce the German surrender. These primary sources on the individual experiences of the 
                                            
63  Robinson, With Botha’s Army, 133. 
26 
campaign have considerable value when interwoven with accounts which address the 
overall strategic and operational situation.64                
 
The German South West African campaign provides an interesting case study in terms of 
the type of problems that it posed for an invading army. In the case of the Union of South 
Africa the problems were twofold. Firstly, the physical geography in German South West 
Africa limited the pace and direction of the advance. Secondly, at the time, internal 
differences were rife in South African society at large and public opinion regarding the 
participation in the campaign was divided.  
 
The geography of German South West Africa is well suited for defence due to the lack of 
water resources for an invading military force. This channels a military force into predictable 
advance routes. The defensive positions which were held by the Germans were thus always 
related to water resources or topographically well suited defensive locations. 
 
There were vast distances between the locations where the various engagements took 
place. The campaign was characterised by operational pauses and forward advances which 
were largely based on the defensive battles put up by the Germans and the availability of 
water for the advancing South African forces. Van der Waag has published the most recent 
scholarly article on the campaign and the Battle of Sandfontein and observes that the 
geography of German South West Africa determined much of the strategic and operational 
planning for the campaign.65  
 
Van der Waag’s article gives keen insight into the difficulties facing the Union Defence 
Forces in terms of the political and cultural schisms present in white South African society at 
the time. These differences fuelled the Afrikaner Rebellion and resulted in the delay of the 
campaign while the rebellion was being put down.  
 
Gerald L’ange and Bill Nasson have both written campaign histories.66 Nasson describes the 
military actions during the rebellion and discusses the divisions between Afrikaner and 
English-oriented South African military cultures at the beginning of the campaign. His 
account places considerable emphasis on socio-cultural differences in the Union and their 
historical dimensions. Nasson’s account gives an overall perspective on the mood and 
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temperament of South African society at the time but has little new to offer in terms of the 
military details of the German South West African campaign. He describes in some depth 
the generally established strategic objectives, military strategy and the transportation 
difficulties experienced by the Union Defence Forces.67 
 
L’ange’s account of the campaign was written for the ‘South Africans at War’ series.68 His 
work, which discusses the landings at Lüderitzbucht, Walvis Bay and the cross-border 
advances of the South African forces, the general operations, as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the South African and German forces.69 He takes into consideration many of 
the regimental histories of the military units involved in the campaign, which adds insight and 
depth to his account.70  
 
Overall there are substantial similarities between L’ange’s and Collyer’s versions as far as 
the description of the course of events and the analysis of the campaign are concerned. 
Similarly, in terms of a complete military history of the campaign, little has been added since 
the publication of the Official History in the 1920s and Collyer’s The Campaign in German 
South West Africa, 1914 –1915’ in the 1930s. 
 
The two most recent accounts of the campaign include one by Tim Couzens, who writes on 
South Africa’s involvement in the First World War, and another by Nasson, who in his most 
recent book describes the situation in South Africa during the First World War.71 A strong 
point of Couzens’s book is that it has an excellent selection of photographs from the First 
World War. Nasson’s work has considerable value in a socio-cultural historical context. Both 
these publications appeared to commemorate the centenary of the First World War and both 
add value to the historiography of the Great War. However for this dissertation which 
focuses on the military sphere these two books offer little further insight because they are 
general in their approach and rely strongly on secondary material.  
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In terms of the relative strengths of the Union Defence Forces, a critical aspect which is 
highlighted by Collyer and supported by L’ange is the use in the Union’s German South 
West African campaign of the ‘surprise’ tactics borrowed from the commandos – mobility and 
initiative.72  
 
A common thread which runs through all the sources is the importance of mobility in the 
campaign. Of course mobility was primarily dependent on the availability of logistical 
support. The mobility, speed and surprise of the Union’s mounted forces became an 
essential characteristic of the campaign and will be analysed below with reference to the 
requirements of manoeuvre warfare theory. 
 
Collyer alludes to the mobility of the mounted soldiers and a national system of tactics which 
he labels the ‘Boer mounted charge’ and explains it as a rapid advance to gain a close firing 
position from where the commandos would dismount and continue the fight on foot with rifle 
in hand.73 Van der Waag comments that Collyer had a special interest in the mounted 
infantry and he named it the ‘national military arm of South Africa’.74  
 
The logistical and transportation difficulties experienced during the campaign have been 
stressed in many publications on the German South West African campaign. Overcoming 
these challenges was central to maintain mobility. H Paterson considers that solving the 
logistical and transportation difficulties was a key factor in the Union’s victory.75 Collyer 
observes that the need for animal and mechanical transport and the effective management 
of these resources was fundamental to the successful execution of the campaign.76 
 
The speed and mobility of the South African forces were dependent on the availability of 
stores and supplies. Botha’s final advance necessitated an operational pause lasting a 
month and a half in order to stockpile the necessary stores and transport.77 The seven 
letters that Botha wrote to Smuts that have been published highlighted Botha’s progress and 
frustrations during the campaign.78 Botha complained about the tense political climate within 
the Union of South Africa in 1915 as well as the difficulties regarding transport and the 
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shortage of horses he was faced with on the campaign. His military operations were based 
on the commando’s mobility which required horses for operational movement and mules and 
wagons to keep the soldiers supplied. The horses and mules allowed for penetrating 
envelopments into German South West Africa which forced the Germans to retreat and 
eventually surrender.79 The dissertation extrapolates from the means and method of the 
attainment of victory to the relation and influence of manoeuvre warfare theory on the 
campaign.  
 
The pro-German sources, of which the latest account is authored by Ungleich, claim that the 
South African numerical superiority was the main reason behind its victory.80 However, 
although they were outnumbered, the Germans also had various military advantages. They 
were operating on interior railway lines and could supply their forces easily and converge 
rapidly81 on an attacking force.82 The defensive strategy of the Germans traded ground for 
time so as to prolong the fight in the hope of a victory in the European theatre of 
operations.83  
 
The dissertation weaves together the various firsthand accounts and secondary sources to 
gain an understanding of the course of events which transpired during the German South 
West African campaign.84 These sources are supplemented with primary material which 
highlights central themes such as the mobility of the mounted soldiers and the rapid pace of 
operations. Primary material is also used to show the need for logistics, transportation and 
military equipment in the campaign to facilitate the military operation and manoeuvre 
warfare.  
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 CHAPTER 3: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY  
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory, as a way of conducting warfare, aims to defeat the enemy with 
the least amount of effort while suffering minimal operational losses. Manoeuvre is regarded 
as an important means of achieving victory in conflict.1 It is an approach to warfare that is 
based on capitalising on the vulnerabilities of human nature.2  
 
Theories of war are essentially an abstract supposition based on the different principles, 
philosophical ideologies and doctrine relative to different military forces and their respective 
commanders. Manoeuvre warfare theory delves into the philosophy of war and focuses on 
the achievement of victory in the fastest and most efficient way.3  
 
The basic components of a war are campaigns, operations and battles. A campaign can be 
defined as a number of operations which are designed to achieve strategic objectives within 
a specific theatre. Operations can be defined as coordinated actions such as battles which 
take place as part of a campaign.4 Battles aim at achieving the operational objectives and 
are normally comprised of a progression of engagements. An engagement is a smaller scale 
conflict consisting of one or more skirmishes.5  
 
The levels of war include the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The respective level of 
war dictates the type of military planning and action that will take place. The strategic level 
concerns itself with objectives on a national level authorised by the national command; the 
operational level pertains to campaigns and is organised around armies and corps; and the 
tactical level refers to battles and engagements usually with divisions, brigades and 
battalions.6 Manoeuvre warfare is conducted on the different levels of war and is aimed at 
achieving a rapid victory at a low cost to resources and human life.  
 
Manoeuvre warfare addresses the means of achieving victory and identifies three possible 
methods, namely: pre-emption, dislocation and disruption. Pre-emption refers to the use of 
manoeuvre to prevent the outbreak of combat, while dislocation refers to the application of 
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manoeuvre once conflict has broken out.7 Similarly, disruption is relevant after the conflict 
has commenced.  
 
Pre-emption is a rejection of established methods to gain victory by attrition or by virtue of 
superior numbers. It is a decisive approach which epitomises speed and victory is attained 
with a characteristically low loss of human life. Pre-emption relies on movement and the 
element of surprise over firepower and calls for a rapid decision making cycle.8 Pre-emption 
denies the enemy freedom of action. The initiative is taken away from the enemy.9 This 
means of achieving victory is based on intuition more than intelligence.10  
 
Dislocation involves the removal of the enemy’s combat strength from the decisive point. It 
includes avoiding combat where the enemy is stronger and choosing how to position one’s 
forces to ensure the best results. An example of this is the surprise attack by the German 
forces on Sedan during the Second World War. The Germans opted to go through the 
Ardennes forest which the Allies did not expect because they thought the terrain was 
inaccessible to military forces.11 Dislocation is based on a good intelligence network and 
makes use of surprise, deep penetrating mechanised (or mounted) drives and envelopment 
to dislocate the physical and psychological spheres of the enemy.12 
 
Disruption involves the attack on and destruction of the enemy’s fighting capability which will 
paralyse the enemy force.13 Disruption is the third means of achieving victory through 
manoeuvre warfare and involves defeating the enemy by attacking the enemy’s centre of 
gravity.14  
 
Clausewitz defines the centre of gravity as ‘the hub of all power and movement on which 
everything depends’.15 Clausewitz was a product of the grand armee era16 and as such was 
a proponent of the direct attack on the enemy’s massed force. The centre of gravity, 
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according to Clausewitz should always be the main army of each side who meet in a 
focused clash with the purpose of achieving a decisive victory.17 The centre of gravity in 
terms of manoeuvre warfare can be defined as the enemy’s ‘critical vulnerability’ which is not 
necessarily the centre of the enemy’s strength.18  
 
The levels of war are intrinsically related to the centre of gravity. The enemy’s centre of 
gravity is its critical vulnerability. By attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity one should 
defeat the enemy. The centre of gravity can be on the strategic, operational or tactical levels 
of war.  
 
In terms of the operational level of war, where manoeuvre warfare is employed the centre of 
gravity is often a headquarters, a central place where senior personnel govern, command 
and direct the forces.19 The centres of gravity at each level of war are related to the objective 
of that respective level (refer to Figure 3).20 Lawrence speaks of the confusion between the 
strategic and tactical levels where some commanders believe it is an end of strategy to 
commit to battle.21  
 
 
Figure 3: The levels of war and their centres of gravity 
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The confusion alluded to by Lawrence is magnified by the reality that certain strategic 
objectives do not always have a tactical solution. Von Moltke stated that in the case where 
tactics dictate the objects of strategy there is a reversal in the traditional role of strategy.22   
 
The strategic level must determine the strategic objectives. The operational level must 
determine how to achieve the strategic ends. The strategic level must formulate and develop 
security policy and military strategic and operational plans. The operational and tactical 
levels must formulate the approach as well as the campaign, operations and battle concept 
and then fight the war.23 Military operations and statecraft pursue a collective aim and are 
parts of the same whole.24  
 
Military commanders often have the daunting task of identifying operational and strategic 
objectives and centres of gravity. The commander would then have to direct resources and 
the focus of the main effort against the enemy’s centre of gravity.25 Leonhard states: 
‘Operational planners must determine how to use the available combat power to achieve the 
goals of a campaign.’26    
 
The notion of achieving results and attacking the centre of gravity with minimal loss is central 
to the conceptualisation of manoeuvre theory. This idea is also a fundamental part of 
Chinese strategic thought which states that the objective should not be at the physical and 
military centre of gravity but rather at the enemy’s moral and stability centre of gravity.27  
 
The military scientific path to the attainment of the centre of gravity involves the realisation of 
decisive points on the respective lines of operations. Decisive points are defined as positions 
in time and space which can threaten the centre of gravity. Lines of operations link decisive 
points and centres of gravity.28   
 
This theoretical application is not always as clear cut as it may appear at first glance. A 
decisive point may for example be the command and communication centres of a military 
force which allows for a certain objective to be taken or enveloped. Liddell Hart states that a 
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dispersed advance could have a single objective or a number of successive objectives or 
alternatively a dispersed advance could have simultaneous objectives.29  
 
The methods of defeating the enemy in manoeuvre warfare involve pre-emption, dislocation 
and disruption which steer away from the brute strength of the enemy (attrition) and instead 
aim to defeat the enemy through the use of mobility and positioning. Leonhard further 
describes these terms by stating: ‘pre-emption involves … relying more on speed than on 
firepower, speed of advance must rob the enemy into retreat … movement fulfils the purest 
form of manoeuvre warfare in defeating the enemy without risk of direct-fire engagements.’30  
 
Diametrically opposed to manoeuvre warfare theory and the psychological dimension is 
attrition warfare theory which focuses on firepower, material difference and the tactical level 
of war. Attrition and manoeuvre theory are the two basic theories applied to conventional 
warfare both are directed at defeating the opposing force. Many soldiers on all levels and 
ranks focus on the tactical level and many military practitioners hope for the end of a given 
war by way of a ‘great battle’.  
 
Attrition focuses on the tactical level and the central purpose is to bring the opposing force to 
a decisive battle through the massing of forces. Essentially this is warfare in the classic 
Clausewitzian mould where the ultimate aim of strategy is to involve large forces in fierce 
confrontation or fixed battle.31 The Western Front of the First World War provided a prime 
example of attrition warfare.32 The operational concepts employed by the Germans in the 
European theatre in the early stages of the First World War can be largely defined as 
offensive as opposed to the option of envelopment.33  
 
It should also perhaps be granted that on the Western Front the option of envelopment may 
have been exhausted due to the mass concentration of forces. The British and French 
military forces had to go through the German defensive positions which were extended in 
length and depth which in turn allowed for no outflanking to take place. The result was an 
attrition-based operation on the Western Front which resulted in a high mortality rate.34  
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The central concept behind attrition theory is the breaking of the opponents will by 
destruction through direct attack. Manoeuvre warfare on the other hand emphasises 
avoiding the ‘enemy’s strength in favour of attacking his weakness’.35 Firepower over 
movement is the focus of attrition theory.  
 
Attrition warfare theory focuses on the material loss of the enemy. It is directed towards the 
physical dimensions of war and aims to hold ground by inflicting more damage on the enemy 
than it can inflict in return. Attrition warfare is essentially static and linear in its approach to 
warfare.36 
 
Manoeuvre warfare extends over the three levels of war.37 The relation between attrition and 
manoeuvre warfare varies over the different levels. On the strategic level the ends of policy 
must be chosen because the core aspects of strategy and the means to affect those ends 
must be identified. If military means are selected to achieve the ends of policy then the 
operational level must formulate a plan for the execution of military operations so as to 
achieve the national military objectives.  
 
The operational level takes shape in campaigns and is always faced with the decision of 
whether to accept battle or not. Should battle be accepted or chosen then military operations 
are shifted into the realm of tactics. On the tactical level manoeuvre and attrition theories are 
interwoven where manoeuvre is translated into mobility and attrition into firepower.38 The 
slower moving attrition element, with reference to its firepower, provides the stability which 
manoeuvre cannot provide on the tactical level.39       
         
Clausewitz and Liddell Hart define strategy in the same vein, referring to the military force of 
a state as a means to be used to fulfil its political ends.40 The operational level is where the 
strategic aims are met and it is also the realm where manoeuvre warfare is executed.41 
‘Grand tactics’ is an antiquated term that refers to the planning and movement of large 
forces between battles which is currently referred to as the operational level of war.42  
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Leonhard defines manoeuvre as focusing on the operational level without including tactical 
battles and states, ‘it [manoeuvre] can be defined as the movement towards an objective 
with the ultimate purpose to gain an advantage over the enemy whether positionally or 
psychologically’.43 Manoeuvre theory deals with the dual spheres of the psychological and 
the physical, where the effect of a rapidly advancing force can demoralise an enemy. 
  
Sun comments that ‘supreme excellence is not to fight and conquer in all your battles but 
rather in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’.44 This statement on the aim of 
strategy is reinforced by Liddell Hart who writes ‘the perfection of strategy … [is] to achieve a 
decision without any serious fighting.’45 Manoeuvre warfare thus aims at the enemy’s critical 
vulnerability, the centre of gravity, and not necessarily at the enemy’s strong point. The 
choice of whether to accept battle or not becomes a decision of great significance.  
 
According to Leonhard, ‘one of the operational commander’s primary functions during a 
campaign is to decide whether to accept battle or whether to decline through manoeuvre’.46 
Sun alludes to what he terms the essentials of victory, which include ‘knowing when to fight; 
knowing how to handle superior and inferior forces [and] high morale in all ranks’. He adds 
that ‘the military capacity should not be interfered with by the sovereign’.47  
 
Theoretically the efforts of a military force should be directed against the vulnerable points of 
the opposing force. Should the military force be directed to fight the strong and defensible 
positions of the opposing force in a direct confrontation, the likely result would be substantial 
loss and destruction. The efforts of a military force should rather be directed against the 
morale and will of the opposing force.48 The loss of morale is linked to the loss of ground and 
the lack of reserves.49  
 
Sun was the first strategist who recorded the importance of the psychological and human 
dimension of warfare.50 Du Picq highlighted the psychological sphere in warfare in the West 
and states that when men feel isolated they require high morale.51 Friction and uncertainty 
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are crucial factors which influence the mind of the commander.52 Jomini and Clausewitz also 
understood the importance of the human aspect in war. Jomini maintains that ‘the superiority 
in armament may increase the chances of success in war, however it does not in itself win 
battles’.53  
 
The previous point regarding the utility of armaments was reinforced by Du Picq who claims 
that ‘weapons are effective only insofar as they influence the morale of the enemy’.54 
Clausewitz contributed the term ‘friction’ to the theory of warfare which refers to the human 
aspects of fear, anxiety, frustration and tiredness and how these factors influence the course 
of warfare. Clausewitz says that friction is intrinsically related to chance in warfare.55  
 
Friction, according to the doctrine propounded by the British Army, is the force which makes 
the execution of certain actions difficult.56 The factors that are fundamentally linked to friction 
are physical exertion, danger, intelligence and uncertainty.57 Friction implies that things 
generally go wrong and soldiers and people make mistakes which are amplified due to 
stress and exhaustion.58 These factors dwell as much in the physical as in the psychological 
realm and can be perceived or real. The difference between a real and perceived threat in 
the mind of the soldier is minimal because the psychological effect is almost identical.59 The 
study of friction forms an essential part of manoeuvre warfare.  
 
The operations of a given army should not have the objective of seeking and committing its 
forces to battle. The objective is the defeat of the enemy – which may or may not require 
battle. Defeating an opposing force has a large psychological dimension which includes 
morale and courage which in turn is affected by surprise and mobility as key aspects of 
manoeuvre theory.60  
 
Morale is defined by the United States Army as ‘the mental, emotional and spiritual state of 
the individual. It is how he feels, [be it] happy hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, sad, 
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unrecognised or depressed.’61 Morale is recognised as the most important aspect of a 
fighting force, whereas discipline and training are also regarded as necessities.62  
     
Morale is one of the intangibles of war and is a concept and phenomenon that has been 
studied in depth by military psychologists and historians. The fundamental function of morale 
is to provide the soldier with the will to win. Studies in the psychological motivation of 
individuals and groups towards commitment to battle are intrinsically linked to the different 
levels of morale within the group and whether the individual and/ or group identifies with the 
need to commit to battle.63 The strong ties between soldiers, based on shared hardship and 
common purpose, leads to a will to fight on.  
 
These and other factors such as determination are also intertwined with soldiers having faith 
in their leadership. When social unity collapses and soldiers’ faith in their commanders 
dwindles then the level and impact of combat stress reactions increase.64 The fear that is felt 
on the battlefield is magnified by isolation.65  
      
The movements that comprise manoeuvre as a concept should at all times be a threat to the 
enemy. Du Picq added in his explanation on the psychology of war that if the enemy felt 
threatened in its position by a large envelopment then it would instinctively retreat.66 When a 
military force threatens the communication lines of an enemy force, the closer that the cut is 
made to a base or the enemy force, the greater the psychological impact.67 
 
The South African principles of war, at present, include manoeuvre and surprise. Surprise 
can have a devastating effect on morale and comprises speed, originality, secrecy and 
deception.68 Surprise often results in panic with the target individual or group feeling 
uncertainty from being entrapped which is accompanied by a feeling that one needs to 
search for immediate escape.69  
 
A feeling of being trapped occurs in the psychological dimension as a result of the physical 
movements and placement of forces. If the line of least resistance is followed in the physical 
                                            
61  Gal and Mangelsdorff eds., Handbook of Military Psychology, 454. 
62  Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, 5. 
63  Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat, 35.  
64  Gal and Mangelsdorff eds., Handbook of Military Psychology, 513. 
65  Glad ed., Psychological Dimensions of War, 229. 
66  Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 45. 
67  Liddell Hart, Strategy, 199. 
68  South African National Defence Force, ‘The Principles of War’, 35. 
69  Glad ed., Psychological Dimensions of War, 229.  
39 
sphere, the line of least expectation (surprise) must be followed in the psychological 
sphere.70 Sun states that all warfare to some extent is based on deception and that one 
should attack the enemy when an attack is least expected.71  
 
The use of the element of surprise, whether in the operational or strategic context, should 
penetrate to great depths within the enemy area of operations without offering battle. This 
will dislocate the enemy forces and psychologically impair their commanders.72 In order to 
execute effective manoeuvre warfare, one must attack the psychological dimension of the 
adversary by attacking the physical enemy in such a way that surprise and dislocation is 
achieved. The effect of a lost battle is more psychological than physical and the retreating 
force will withdraw until they reach a strong defensive position that can be held or reinforced 
with reserves.73  
 
The effects of retreating and being surrounded may lead to combat stress reactions. Combat 
stress reactions compromise the effective functioning of the leadership of a military unit 
based on a drop in morale with the primary causal factor being the fear of death in combat.74     
 
Two fundamental elements which are critical to the defeat of a given enemy are its will to 
resist and its cohesion.75 Manoeuvre should be carried out in such a way that the enemy 
feels overwhelmed by the attack or advance (or the threat of the attack or advance). In 
psychological terms this is related to stress casualties who are more numerous at a low point 
in morale. Under severe conditions of stress, soldiers feel incapable of fighting even if they 
are not physically wounded.76  
 
Movement and surprise are the elements which are available to destroy the enemy’s will to 
resist. Movement lies in the physical realm and surprise exists in the psychological 
dimension. The two elements are proportional because movement creates surprise and 
surprise gives rise to movement.77 The effect of movement and surprise is related to the 
enemy morale. 
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Enemy morale is often unrelated to its physical wellbeing and even if a military force 
experiences no losses it may become panic-stricken and be useless as a fighting force.78 In 
order to attack the psychological wellbeing of the enemy, its will to resist or cohesion should 
be attacked and compromised. By attacking the will of the enemy one destroys the enemy’s 
belief that it can win.79 
 
Within the psychological sphere the importance of personality on warfare is of great 
significance. Essentially the perception of a competent and motivational commander inspires 
his forces and assists in the formation of morale. Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery 
commented, ‘if the approach to the human factor is cold and impersonal, then you achieve 
nothing’.80  
 
Many great commanders of the past had similar effects on their soldiers. Napoleon’s 
charisma had a magnetic effect on his soldiers and an equally intimidating impact on his 
opponents. Similarly, General Erwin Rommel held great sway over his soldiers and equally 
over his opponents.81 The charisma of great commanders such as Napoleon and Rommel 
acts as a force multiplier on the pre-emption and deterrence ability of a force.82  
 
The greater the psychological impact on an opposing force, the fewer resources will be 
required to defeat it. This psychological effect is achieved by deception and surprise and by 
the positioning of own forces in the rear of the opposing force.83 The indirect approach 
should be used for the dislocation of the mental and physical spheres using minimal 
resources.84  
 
Manoeuvre theory is essentially offensive in nature but there may be occasions when a 
defensive position has to be taken in preparation for the advance and attack to commence.85 
In terms of manoeuvre warfare the numerical difference is not of vital significance; more 
important is the impact it has in terms of the effective use of the space available.86   
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The offensive should be aimed at the enemy’s effective fighting strength and not merely at 
the taking and holding of ground. Simpkin states that ground should only be held if it stands 
for a fixed enemy resource such as a bridge or an important base.87 Fixed resources such 
as bridges and landing strips facilitate the movement and management of logistics.  
 
Logistics are fundamental to modern warfare and determine how large a force can be 
deployed. Logistics also determine how these forces are to be maintained in terms of 
rations, ammunition, fuel and other requirements and the flow and rhythm of operations.88  
 
An operational pause must be taken at a time when the operation is no longer sustainable. 
The operational pause along one line of operations should be met with the hastening of the 
tempo on an alternative line of operations.89 Liddell Hart states that dislocation can be 
produced by forcing an enemy to change front by separating its forces, endangering its 
supplies and/or cutting off possible routes of retreat.90 
 
Sun speaks of the military components necessary to execute manoeuvre warfare which 
include, ‘an “ordinary” force that would pin down the enemy and an “extraordinary” force that 
would perform a manoeuvre so as to outflank the enemy’.91 The ordinary force fixes the 
enemy and the extraordinary force is used to strike.92 Jomini maintains that the chances of 
victory are far greater when there is a direct attack and a flanking manoeuvre.93  
 
Lawrence claims that the only tactic which he found worked effectively were rapid mounted 
charges at the enemy’s rear.94 The methods of direct and indirect attack have been used by 
different commanders across the ages and in different parts of the world to achieve their 
military objectives. Direct and indirect strategies can result in a multitude of different 
operational plans.95  
 
Boyd’s decision cycle or loop is a continuous process of ‘observation, orientation, decision 
and action (OODA)’.96 By completing this cycle before the enemy can do so and thus 
disrupting the enemy’s OODA cycle, one gains the initiative. Boyd’s theory is largely 
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psychological and deals with the will and morale of the fighting force.97 Essentially, 
manoeuvre theory aims to disrupt the thought processes of the opposing force.98  
 
In order to achieve surprise one must be able to interfere with the OODA cycle of the enemy 
and retain the initiative at a high tempo.99 On the operational level an example of taking the 
initiative is cutting the enemy’s logistical lines through an enveloping advance or attack. 
Figure 4 is a representation of a direct and enveloping attack on the enemy and the link 
between the psychological and physical dimensions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Direct and indirect attack 
 
The side that seizes and maintains the initiative is often the side that wins the battle as 
opposed to winning by numerical superiority alone.100 Liddell Hart states that whereas the 
enemy’s outward appearance of numbers and resources indicate strength these factors are 
dependent on morale, control and supply.101  
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In order to attack the cohesion of the enemy one could use tempo, simultaneity or surprise. 
Tempo is attacking the enemy at a varying rate; one to which the enemy is unable to 
respond effectively. Simultaneity is related to tempo and aims to attack the enemy from 
many different routes and angles which overloads the decision making ability (OODA cycle) 
of the enemy commanders. Surprise creates shock and is based on doing the unexpected 
where the enemy is not given time to respond.102 
 
The aim of manoeuvre warfare is to attempt to gain victory through methods other than 
pitched battle. The theory of manoeuvre warfare occurs at a high cognitive level and is often 
misunderstood by those focused on the tactical level. The ultimate role of the commander is 
to defeat the enemy as opposed to destroying the enemy.103 The true aim of strategy ‘is not 
to seek battle but rather to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not in 
itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this’.104  
 
The discussion on the course of events of the campaign will show how the German South 
West African campaign provided a text-book case of manoeuvre warfare theory. The 
following sections deal with a description and analysis of the campaign.  
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 CHAPTER 4: THE GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN AND THE 
AFRIKANER REBELLION 
 
Overview of the German South West African campaign 
 
From the late 18th century, South Africa’s value to Great Britain had been its strategic 
location at the southernmost tip of Africa which allowed for British naval and commercial 
ships to rest, recuperate and re-supply. The security of the Union’s sea ports was 
considered a fundamental part of the British Naval strategy.1 The German South West 
African campaign was the first involvement of the Union of South Africa in the First World 
War and was directly related to the control of British sea routes.  
 
The German East Asiatic Squadron, commanded by Vice Admiral Maximillian Graf von 
Spee, had methodically disrupted the British naval trade and troop movements in the Indian 
Ocean in the early stages of the Great War.2 In order to control the supply of its own forces 
successfully during the First World War, the British had to neutralise the German naval 
threat. The harbours in German South West Africa, namely Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund, 
were possible refuelling and re-supply points for German naval shipping, and even more so 
for the raiders of Von Spee’s East Asiatic Squadron.  
 
The wireless stations in Lüderitzbucht, Windhoek and Swakopmund were also of strategic 
concern to the British Empire because they allowed for international communication (via a 
relay station in Togo) between German warships at sea and Berlin.3 The control of the 
harbours and wireless stations in German South West Africa became a matter or strategic 
importance, with Lewis Vernon Harcourt, the secretary for the colonies describing it as ‘a 
great and urgent imperial service’.4 
 
The strategic plan for the invasion included amphibious landings at Lüderitzbucht and Walvis 
Bay. The proposed force at Walvis Bay was to advance via the shortest distance to 
Windhoek. The strategic plan as determined by Smuts was stifled by the British War Office 
which decided that the naval vessels could only transport troops to Lüderitzbucht. The 
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invasion plan was thus changed and improvised to a less efficient one which Smuts was not 
entirely satisfied with.5 
 
The initial invasion comprised the amphibious landings of the South African forces at 
Lüderitzbucht and at Port Nolloth. The military force at Port Nolloth landed on 31 August 
1914 and advanced across the Orange River into German South West Africa via Raman’s 
Drift and Sandfontein. The amphibious landing at Lüderitzbucht took place on 18 September 
1914 and the port city was taken unopposed. Raman’s Drift was occupied on 14 September 
1914. The wireless station at Swakopmund was also destroyed on 14 September 1914 by 
naval shelling.6 
 
The South African force grouping which took Raman’s Drift continued its advance to 
Sandfontein where it was defeated by a German military force. The defeat at Sandfontein 
coincided with the outbreak of the Afrikaner Rebellion in the Union. All further invasion 
efforts were put on hold until the end of the rebellion in late 1914.7 The force grouping at 
Lüderitzbucht remained there until the invasion was resumed. 
 
The destruction of the German East Asiatic Squadron at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 
8 December 1914, gave the British unprecedented superiority at sea in the South Atlantic. In 
turn, this allowed for freedom of movement in terms of further naval and amphibious assault 
on German South West Africa.8 The Union thus reverted to its initial strategic plan which 
included a deployment of its forces at Walvis Bay. 
 
The second amphibious landing was executed and Walvis Bay was taken unopposed on 25 
December 1914. There were also two South African force groupings deployed from across 
the Union and German South West African border in March 1915. Once the Union Defence 
Forces was deployed, the physical geography of German South West Africa proved a great 
obstacle to the campaign by hampering the logistical supply of the troops. The terrain in 
German South West Africa is largely favourable for defence due to its extensive plateau 
which started at sea level rose to 1060 metres in the interior. The desolate area receives 
little rainfall and is isolated by a desert belt on the western coast, of between 60 and 160 
kilometres wide, that rises to the height of the plateau. At the time, German South West 
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Africa had no formal roads and was bordered in the south and the southeast by the Great 
Namaqualand and Kalahari Desert respectively.9  
 
The Namib Desert had two railway lines that were inclusive to the colony. These lines 
provided mobility from the coastal towns of Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund to the interior. 
The line linked up with the north (Windhoek/Karibib) – south (Kalkfontein) railway line in the 
interior of German South West Africa (refer to Figure 5).10 Map 1 shows the disparity in size 
between the theatres of operations in Europe and that of German South West Africa; while 
Map 2 indicates the German South West African terrain and infrastructure. 
 
 
Map 1: Comparison of the sizes of the theatre of operations in German South West Africa 
and Europe11  
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Map 2: Terrain and infrastructure of German South West Africa12 
 
The Germans had the advantage of operating on interior lines which enabled them to 
concentrate superior numbers within most of the colony during the advance of the South 
African forces.13 Despite having superior numbers, the Union Defence Forces was unable to 
advance with its entire force at any one time, hence the Germans had the option of 
concentrating on the smaller South African advances on different lines of operations. 
 
Von Heydebreck, who was the commander of the German forces in German South West 
Africa, was a competent officer and he placed his forces strategically in and around 
Windhoek and Keetmanshoop. He held the central position and used his budding aviation 
corps to determine the location of the South African forces and where to launch his 
attacks.14 
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The advance routes of the Union Defence Forces were determined by the availability of 
water. The Germans found an ally in the desert and they exacerbated the general shortage 
of water supplies by poisoning the water wells with carbolic acid and sheep dip or tossing 
decomposing animals into the water.15  
 
The British and German general staffs considered that crossing the Namib Desert was 
impossible.16 Botha described German South West Africa as a natural fortress.17 The 
Germans also improvised mines and booby traps to impede the Union’s advance.  
 
The Battle of Sandfontein 
 
The initial invasion of German South West Africa comprised two force groupings. Lukin 
landed in Port Nolloth on 31 August 1914 along with an artillery complement of, five mounted 
regiments, the Witwatersrand Rifles, a section of engineers and an ammunition column.18 
Lukin’s advance with ‘A’ force, the first of the Force groupings, was hindered by ‘B’ Force 
commander, Commandant Manie Maritz, who had defected (because he did not identify with 
British interests) and from that time onwards was in collusion with the Germans.19  
 
The Germans were aware of the tensions in South Africa.20 Walker discusses the extent of 
German influence in the Afrikaner Rebellion stating that the Kaiser had met with Beyers 
(commandant general of the Citizen Force) as early as 1913.21 The Germans assisted in 
fomenting rebellion in South Africa with the express intention of delaying the invasion.22  
 
The tensions within South Africa were already present at the outbreak of the First World War 
and the Germans supported Maritz and Beyers to promote rebellion. The Cape Argus 
reported on 3 February 1915 that ‘the Rebellion, which the Germans engineered with such 
characteristic cunning and duplicity, was a scheme upon which they undoubtedly set great 
score’.23 The invasion of German South West Africa was halted until the rebellion was put 
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down. The first attempt at invading German South West Africa led to the Battle of 
Sandfontein.  
Maritz with the ‘B’ Force was supposed to have supported Lukin in the cross-border advance 
through Raman’s Drift and Sandfontein. Collyer states that even if everything had gone 
according to plan and with proper coordination, the advance would have been risky but an 
advance of either force in isolation would have been akin to failure.24 
 
Lukin was an experienced soldier and officer and led five South African Mounted Regiments, 
comprised of 1 800 riflemen with artillery support, from Port Nolloth northwards to the 
Orange River. There was railway transport available from Port Nolloth to Steinkopf, but from 
there onwards the only means of transportation and logistical supply was donkey and mule 
drawn wagons.  
 
The distance from Steinkopf to the Orange River was about 97 kilometres which had no 
natural water supply.25 The Germans knew that the South Africans had to advance along 
predetermined routes in accordance with the availability of water.26  
 
There was a German force advancing on Raman’s Drift from the north while Lukin advanced 
on Raman’s Drift from Steinkopf in the south. Lukin wanted to occupy it before the arrival of 
the Germans.27 Lukin’s plan for advance was to go through Raman’s Drift, Warmbad, 
Kalkfontein and Seeheim.28 The Germans had a blockhouse with negligible personnel at 
Raman’s Drift which was easily taken by the 4th South African Mounted Regiment on 14 
September 1914. Map 3 shows the advance route of the South African forces and the Battle 
of Sandfontein. 
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Map 3: Battle of Sandfontein29  
 
‘C’ Force landed at Lüderitzbucht on 18 September shortly after the taking of Raman’s Drift 
by Lukin’s advance force. Lukin had sent up an advance detachment comprised of 
approximately 200 soldiers of the 4th and 5th Regiments of the South African Mounted Rifles 
which had advanced via Raman’s Drift and then subsequently arrived at Sandfontein on 19 
September 1914. Captain E Welby was sent up to Sandfontein with a squadron from 
Raman’s Drift in support of the 4th and 5th Regiments of the South African Mounted Rifles.30 
Lukin’s main force arrived at Raman’s Drift on 24 September 1914. Colonel CAL Berrange 
was part of ‘A’ Force and was sent to Houm’s Drift to the east so as to cover the Union’s 
advance on a wide front. 31  
 
Defence Headquarters wanted Lukin to move north of the Orange River to deter a possible 
German attack on the South African forces that had landed at Lüderitzbucht. Lukin was 
reluctant to send his forces north of the Orange River without having the necessary logistical 
support. Defence headquarters ordered supplies up to Sandfontein to facilitate the advance 
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on Warmbad.32 This was in line with defence headquarters plan to take pressure off the 
force that had landed at Lüderitzbucht by requesting Lukin to advance from the south.33  
 
Von Heydebreck had planned a daring attack on the advancing South Africans. He massed 
his troops at Sandfontein on interior lines and was hoping to bring any South African 
invasion plans to a decisive halt.34 Von Heydebreck had to consider the deployments of the 
Union Defence Forces at Lüderitzbucht as well as those south of the Orange River. 
 
The Germans decided to destroy the railway line running from Lüderitzbucht to the interior to 
delay the advance of the South Africans deployed at the port town. Von Heydebreck 
organised a large concentration of German resources for the Battle of Sandfontein, including 
those under Major D von Rapport, Major H Ritter and Major V Franke,35 who deployed with a 
column each on Sandfontein. Von Heydebreck commanded the German force personally.36 
 
On 25 September 1914 at 17:00 the intelligence officer at Sandfontein reported that a 
German detachment was seen in the vicinity of Aurus. Furthermore there was movement of 
German forces in a southerly direction from Warmbad. On receiving the news, Lukin 
responded by sending Lieutenant Colonel RC Grant up to reinforce the force at Sandfontein 
under the command of Welby.37 Grant was sent to support the force at Sandfontein with one 
section of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, a machinegun section and one squadron of the 1st 
Regiment of the South African Mounted Rifles.38  
 
The position at Sandfontein was untenable because it was encircled by high ground in the 
form of the surrounding hills.39 Furthermore the squadron deployed there did not have a 
secure supply line and its rear was not protected.40  
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The tactical disposition at Sandfontein was dire.41 There were hills to the north, northeast 
and northwest that commanded the position; and the dry riverbed that ran from the 
southwest to the east gave the attacking force good cover.42 The Union Defence Forces 
detachment at Sandfontein was thus exposed and was positioned in low ground encircled by 
surrounding high ground which gave the enemy natural cover of advance, protection and 
various vantage points from which to deploy its forces.43 
 
Grant arrived on the morning of 26 September 1914. Von Heydebreck allowed Grant’s relief 
column to arrive at Sandfontein without opposition.44 Von Heydebreck had good intelligence 
regarding the South African movements which included aerial reconnaissance and other 
sources, such as Maritz. The German forces concentrated on Sandfontein with 
approximately 2 000 soldiers, four batteries of artillery and machine guns.45  
 
On that same morning of 26 September as Grant arrived, the Germans converged on 
Sandfontein with a large military force which had been massed in secret. The Germans 
attacked from the north, south, east and west.46  
 
The Germans commenced with an artillery bombardment which began a little after Grants’ 
arrival at 7:25.47 Grant deployed his two artillery pieces at the base of the kopje and the 
infantrymen made a line around the hill using rifle fire to keep the Germans at bay. The 
Germans bombarded the South African position extensively, shelling the wagons, horses 
and mules as well as spraying shrapnel over the infantrymen.48 Lieutenant FB Adler from the 
Transvaal Horse Artillery was in command of the guns and at 8:00 he was ordered to open 
fire on the German column advancing from the southwest.49 Artillery fire was heard from 
Lukin’s position in Ramans Drift at 8:00.50  
 
The German force had surrounded the South African camp and shelled it from the 
northwest, northeast and southwest. The German infantry and machinegun sections had 
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also encircled the Union’s position.51 The South African artillery countered the German 
artillery attack from the northeast and then from the northwest.52 
 
The South Africans sent a relief force from Raman’s Drift and another from Houm’s Drift. 
However, both were intercepted and pinned down by the well prepared Germans. The Union 
force that advanced from Raman’s Drift was anticipated by the Germans who promptly 
ambushed them, pinning them down with machinegun fire. The Union force which advanced 
from Houm’s Drift was met by infantrymen with machinegun support and was forced to 
withdraw.53 The Union’s artillery pieces at Sandfontein were destroyed by the German guns 
at approximately the same time that the relief force from Houm’s Drift was checked by the 
Germans.54 
 
The Germans intensified their bombardment of Sandfontein and after ten hours of fighting, 
Grant raised the white flag. He realised that no military objective could be reached by further 
resistance because they were cut off and the relief force had not managed to repel the 
Germans or spring them free. Lukin was in agreement with Grant’s decision to surrender on 
inspecting the battlefield on 27 September 1914.55  
 
The Union displayed great strength at arms; they were severely outnumbered and 
outgunned but managed to hold out for over ten hours during an intense battle. The Union 
forces at Sandfontein eventually surrendered at 18:00.56 The South African casualties were 
14 killed and 51 wounded which included Grant, while the German casualties numbered 23 
killed, including the death of Von Rapport.57 
 
Many sources attribute the defeat at Sandfontein to the treachery of Maritz because he did 
not advance to support Lukin’s cross-border operations.58 Collyer assigns a great deal of 
blame to defence headquarters that ordered Lukin’s force to advance. Collyer raises the 
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point that regardless of whether Maritz supported Lukin or not, the Germans could have 
massed a larger force than the combined strength of Maritz and Lukin’s forces.59 In contrast, 
Warwick apportions most of the blame to Smuts for the undue haste of the Union’s advance 
and for placing political objectives ahead of military considerations and realities.60 
 
It appears that there was some negligence on the part of reconnaissance parties and scouts 
who were sent out. They neither saw nor reported on any German troops in the vicinity of 
Sandfontein.61 Another interesting point is that despite receiving intelligence on the 
movement of German troops to the south, defence headquarters did not inform Lukin of this 
in any great haste. The information was not telegraphed to Lukin – it was, posted.62 As for 
Smuts, he wanted to reaffirm the political decision to invade German South West Africa with 
military action on the ground.63 Van der Waag re-evaluates the loss at Sandfontein from a 
strategic and organisational point of view. His analysis is the most recent and arguably the 
most balanced approach to the complex study of military victories and defeats.64  
 
Analysis of the Battle of Sandfontein with reference to manoeuvre warfare theory 
 
From a South African perspective the Battle of Sandfontein demonstrated an example of 
static warfare which is more inclined towards attrition warfare theory. The Union Defence 
Forces column advanced to Sandfontein, which was an untenable defensive position where 
they had to rely on firepower in response to the German attack.  
 
The Germans made excellent use of mobility. The German forces were operating on internal 
lines of communications whereas the South Africans were using external lines of 
communications in terms of the invasion effort. Internal lines of operations theoretically allow 
a smaller force to concentrate rapidly on an objective, whereas external lines of 
communications allow for a larger force to surround and overcome its opponent.65 The 
German forces were numerically superior at the Battle of Sandfontein because they 
mobilised approximately 2 000 soldiers from different parts of German South West Africa 
while the South African forces only numbered about 300.66 
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The efficiency of internal lines of operations was demonstrated by the Germans at the Battle 
of Sandfontein; the Union Defence Forces received its baptism of fire in terms of 
conventional operations. The German forces concentrated on Sandfontein with astonishing 
speed and surprise which overwhelmed the unsuspecting South African forces.  
 
The speed of the German advance robbed the Union of its military initiative and they were 
essentially reactive to a completely dominant German attack. The operation was 
characterised by inefficient South African intelligence and predictable military advances.67 
Lukin justified his attack on Sandfontein by saying that he wanted to hold the only water 
supply in the area.68 
 
Manoeuvre warfare theory is dependent on good intelligence and a rapid decision making 
cycle which is intended to gain and keep the initiative. At the Battle of Sandfontein it was the 
Germans who had good intelligence and a rapid decision making cycle. They had a well 
planned attack and maintained the initiative by positioning blocking forces south of 
Sandfontein which stifled the Union’s attempts to reinforce its detachments at Sandfontein. 
 
The Union’s advance reached its culmination at Sandfontein. The advance of Lukin’s entire 
force was extended from Sandfontein to Raman’s Drift, Houm’s Drift, Steinkopf and Port 
Nolloth.69 It was advancing to no definable military operational objective while extending its 
logistical lines. Lukin was unable to effectively support the forces deployed at Sandfontein.70 
At the tactical level the water supply was an objective, but it did not link up to an operational 
objective which would support the successful execution of the campaign. Tactical objectives 
should link up to an achievable operational objective. An advance on any given tactical and 
operational objectives should have sufficient logistics to keep the troops supplied and 
mobile. 
 
In extending its advance beyond its capacity, the Union’s force made itself susceptible to the 
rapid concentration of German forces. The Union forces were due for an operational pause 
in order to regroup, replenish and re-supply before deciding whether or not to advance on 
Sandfontein.  
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On the strategic level, the Union required an advance into German South West Africa to 
show solidarity to the British war effort and the ‘urgent imperial service’. On the operational 
level there was no conceptualisation of a definable decisive point or objective which 
theoretically should have led to the German centre of gravity. The operational advance was 
thus directed by a strategic consideration without realistic operational objectives and without 
sufficient logistical support.  
 
The Union force at Sandfontein had reached its culmination point and was deployed in an 
untenable tactical position. Manoeuvre warfare is intended to be offensive which is in 
contrast to the Union’s advance on Sandfontein, where a defensive position had to be taken. 
The Union force at Sandfontein was surrounded and cut off from its supply and 
communication lines and thus it was compelled to surrender. 
 
The Afrikaner Rebellion 
 
The Afrikaner Rebellion allowed for a brief halt in operations in German South West Africa 
and forced the Union Defence Forces to become engaged in quelling the rebellion inside the 
Union. British intelligence had been aware that the Germans were considering fomenting 
rebellion in South Africa since 1908.71 The Germans were counting on the rebellion to 
distract the Union government to give them a military advantage in terms of time, and to 
weaken the unity of the Union Defence Forces.72  
 
Reitz, who was a veteran of the South African War and an ardent supporter of Smuts, stated 
that the political situation in the Union had gone from bad to worse because half the 
population were not on speaking terms.73 The South African entrance into the First World 
War became the trigger cause of the Afrikaner Rebellion. However, there were also other 
factors which contributed to the rebellion, including poverty, social pressures, political issues 
and economic interests.74  
 
Maritz had signed a treaty with the Germans and took refuge with his fellow defectors in 
German South West Africa after refusing to support the Union’s advance on Sandfontein in 
late September 1914. Lieutenant Colonel CR De Wet, who was a commandant in the South 
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African War, became one of the rebel leaders in the Orange Free State.75 Beyers resigned 
his commission on 15 September 1914 along with Major J Kemp and these two former 
officers of the Union Defence Forces and their supporters were prominent figures in the 
Afrikaner Rebellion.76 Beyers took the lead in the Transvaal. The Union Defence Forces’s 
military operations to put down the rebellion were thus directed at the forces of Beyers, 
Kemp, Maritz and De Wet. The rebel leaders became the centre of gravity.  
 
On 12 October 1914, Smuts declared martial law in support of the suppression of the 
rebellion.77 Botha declined the British offer of assistance and for the most part used 
Afrikaners78 when he took to the field with 32 000 troops.79 His motivation for this decision 
was to minimise the simmering tension between English speakers and Afrikaans-speaking 
South Africans. 
 
Smuts was deeply involved in the organisation of putting down the Afrikaner Rebellion. 
There were 15 military districts which reported to defence headquarters. Smuts used these 
military districts to gain intelligence on the formation and movement of the different rebel 
groupings.  
 
Botha and Smuts decided to concentrate their forces in and around Pretoria and to deploy 
on internal lines to the areas where they were most required.80 The strategy of the Union 
Defence Forces entailed rapid movement from a central position to rebel strongholds via 
internal lines, using trains (and motorcars to  some extent) for operational movement (over 
large distances) and horses for tactical movement (over shorter distances related to battle). 
The Union faced a threat from Maritz in German South West Africa; Beyers in the Transvaal; 
Kemp in the Northern Cape; and De Wet in the Orange Free State. 
 
The Durban Light Infantry was sent to the Northern Cape as reinforcements which served as 
a buffer force in the event of a German attack. Commandant Coen Brits was appointed as 
the commander of the entire area of the Northern Cape.81  
 
                                            
75  Reitz, Trekking On, 50. 
76  Van der Waag, ‘The Battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914’, 9. 
77  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 56; Ritchie states that the proclamation of martial law was on 
22 October 1914: Ritchie, With Botha in the Field, 4. 
78  Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 239. 
79  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 43–45. 
80  Trew, Botha Treks, 29. 
81  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 53. 
58 
The Germans ordered Maritz to attack Upington, while Union Defence headquarters 
instructed Brits to check Maritz’s advances. Maritz was defeated at Keimoes on 22 October 
1914 and then again at Kakamas. He then withdrew to German South West Africa after 
being wounded in the knee. The force under Maritz comprised an estimated 1 000 rebels.82  
 
The Union Defence Forces received word on 25 October 1914 that Beyers was marching on 
Rustenburg with approximately 4 000 rebels. A Mr J Watt reported the incident and his 
report was forwarded to defence headquarters.83 Botha and his bodyguard were 
subsequently deployed to Rustenburg in pursuit of Beyers.  
 
Before Botha took to the field, he sent a personal message to his wife Annie: ‘I have said 
goodbye to you in many difficult circumstances, but never on such a painful occasion as this. 
God give me strength to do my duty.’84 Botha’s bodyguard entrained in Pretoria on 26 
October with horses, saddles and all the necessary equipment. Botha and his bodyguard 
detrained on 27 October 1914 in Rustenburg with his commando. Botha deployed a 
commando to Kommissie Drift after receiving an intelligence report confirming the 
whereabouts of Beyers. Botha’s troops then marched through Olifantsnek where they 
engaged Beyers’ force85 and scattered the rebels.86 Beyers and the remnants of his force 
were pursued to the Vaal River where the majority of the rebels surrendered. Rather than 
face defeat, Beyers fled.87 With the rebel force effectively dispersed, Botha returned to 
Pretoria to focus on the uprising in the Free State.88  
 
In the time just prior to the scattering of Beyers’ force, he was in negotiations with the 
government for his surrender and that of his rebels. Smuts allowed Beyers to be in contact 
with De Wet via telegraph but refused that messengers be allowed through Union lines.89 No 
decisive result was achieved by the negotiations. Beyers was on the run for three weeks 
after the dispersal of his forces and met an unfortunate end on 8 December by drowning in 
the Vaal River while pursued by Union forces.90 
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Beyers was a significant threat as were Kemp and De Wet. To deal with the threat from 
Kemp, Colonel JJ Alberts was despatched to Treurfontein where Kemp had been active. 
Alberts arrived in Treurfontein on 29 October and sent out a reconnaissance team which 
made contact with a group of Kemp’s rebels. The rebels captured the reconnaissance group 
after luring them in with white flags.91  
 
The main body of the Union forces under the command of Alberts managed to engage 
Kemp’s force and captured 240 rebels – the bulk of Kemp’s commando.92 The Union forces 
reported 13 rebels killed and 36 injured in the action at Treurfontein.93 However, Kemp 
managed to escape and Smuts then proceeded with mopping up operations. He sent Alberts 
on a wide front from Treurfontein to Wolmaranstad where he received the support of 
commandos loyal to the Union.94 Kemp eventually managed to cross the German South 
West African border where he joined Maritz and other defectors. 
 
In total, the Union forces took approximately 400 prisoners in their operations against Beyers 
and Kemp.95 Kemp headed for German South West Africa with some 800 rebels. The 
strength of the force with Maritz was estimated at about 1 000 rebels. 
 
The Afrikaner Rebellion gained popularity in the Orange Free State under De Wet and it was 
of great importance for the government to quash it rapidly. Botha had planned a meeting in 
Vereeniging to assemble the required commandos who were going to advance on the 
Orange Free State. In this province the rebels numbered approximately 5 000. Botha took 
personal command of the Union force against De Wet.96 Botha departed from Pretoria on 9 
November with his personal bodyguard and arrived in Winburg on 11 November 1914, 
shortly after De Wet and his followers had left the town. 97  
 
Botha was en route to telegraph Smuts when he received a telephone call at the local post 
office, where he learnt that De Wet was at Mushroom Valley. The caller was being held 
captive at the farm in Mushroom Valley.98 Ritchie claims that the Union force arrived in 
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Winburg two hours after De Wet had left and found the inhabitants in a state of panic. De 
Wet and his followers had informed them that the government was on the verge of being 
toppled and that Germany had defeated Britain.99 
 
Botha’s scouts had already mentioned that De Wet might move to Mushroom Valley, so 
Botha’s force headed in a south-easterly direction to meet the men under Botha’s foe and 
former comrade.100 Botha planned the encirclement of Mushroom Valley with his trusted 
commanders MW Myburgh, Lukin, Brits and Colonel G Brand. Brits and Lukin were 
cooperating on Botha’s right flank.101 The entire force marched through the night and at 
dawn the artillery opened fire on De Wet’s forces – they scattered in disarray at the sound of 
the first shell exploding.102 
 
Myburgh attacked through the centre while Brand enveloped the rebels to the right.103 De 
Wet’s forces were caught unawares in the morning and they almost instantly broke into 
retreat. Brits was in command of the cut off force that was positioned to intercept the 
retreating rebels. Reitz was one of the subordinate officers under Brits and he maintains that 
they were unable to cut off the fleeing rebels.104 While the fighting ensued, Trew was trying 
to keep Botha away from the action to protect him from a stray bullet.105  
 
Lukin was also deployed in support of the cut off force but was unable to intercept the rebels 
as they fled through the Koraanberg.106 Lukin was not in position at the pivotal point when 
the rebels passed by in full flight.107 Nor did the heliographer relay the message to Lukin as 
instructed by Botha.108 After the battle, Botha inspected the battlefield with deep sorrow and 
commented, ‘you English will never understand how hard this is for me’.109 
 
De Wet managed to escape although the confrontation ended with 22 rebels dead and 3 000 
captured and the rebellion in the Orange Free State was for the most part neutralised.110 De 
Wet made his escape with the speed and cunning that made him such a worthy adversary 
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against the British in the South African War. He had skilfully eluded capture fourteen years 
earlier in a similar fashion at Surrender Hill in the Brandwater Basin where General Prinsloo 
had surrendered.  
 
Botha and his men then trekked to Clocolan where they entrained on 18 November and 
headed for Kimberley via Bloemfontein.111 There were several commandos that 
subsequently surrendered after the Battle of Mushroom Valley which included groupings of 
100 up to 2 000.112 
 
Botha and his bodyguard returned to Kroonstad on 29 November to finalise the required 
mopping up operations of the remnants of the Afrikaner Rebellion. Botha met with Smuts on 
30 November at Kroonstad from where Botha and his men moved to Bethlehem.113 De Wet 
was captured by Brits on 1 December 1914 while the rebel leader was en route to German 
South West Africa. Brits, who had exchanged horse for motorcar in his cross-country chase, 
eventually caught up with De Wet in Bechuanaland at the dry riverbed of the Molopo 
River.114  
 
Reitz commented wryly on this somewhat unconventional capture of De Wet: ‘When I heard 
how the obstinate old guerrilla leader had been run to earth with the help of these 
mechanical contrivances I was almost sorry, for it spelt the end of our picturesque South 
African commando system.’115  
 
The remaining rebel commandos surrendered on 10 December 1914 at Loskop in the 
Orange Free State.116 By December 1914, the rebellion was withering away and the only 
rebels who posed a threat were those under Maritz and Kemp who were still at large in 
German South West Africa. 
 
The Afrikaner Rebellion in the Transvaal ground to a halt with the death of Beyers. There 
was sporadic resistance throughout the Union which was gradually snuffed out. Jopie Fourie 
was one of the few hardliner rebels in the Transvaal who remained at large. Smuts called 
Trew in to assist Colonel Pretorius with the attack on Fourie’s commando that was 
encamped at Roodekoppies. Fourie’s commando later moved from Roodekoppies and 
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camped at Nooitgedacht farm. Here, at 16:30 on 16 December 1914, Trew and Pretorius 
defeated Fourie’s commando with a double envelopment attack. After some resistance the 
rebels surrendered.117 Fourie was later served with the death penalty because he did not 
resign his commission in the Union Defence Forces before defecting to the rebels.118 
 
Maritz’s attack on Upington in January 1915 can be regarded as the final phase of the 
Afrikaner Rebellion. Von Heydebreck ordered Maritz to attack Upington and offered him 
German military support to do so.119  
 
The rebels assaulted Upington directly with an extended artillery barrage from both flanks 
and rifle fire. However, Maritz and Kemp were unable to enter the town despite their 
desperate attempts, which even included a mounted charge.120 The attack on the town of 
Upington (refer to Map 4) on 24 January 1915 lasted six hours and Colonel JL Van 
Deventer,121 who was in command, ensured a decisive victory for the Union.122  
 
 
Map 4: Illustration of the engagement at Upington123 
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According to Lord S Buxton, the governor general of South Africa, the rebels had no clear 
campaign plan, no staff work, no cooperation and no definite objectives.124 Following the 
failed attempt at Upington the rebels based in German South West Africa surrendered on 30 
January 1915. Smuts gave the official figures of the rebellion as 130 government soldiers 
killed and 275 wounded; and 190 rebels killed and 400 wounded.125 The total number of 
rebels who were captured and surrendered is indicated in Table 1. 
 
Province Captured Surrendered Total 
Orange Free State 3 138 3 985 7 123 
Transvaal 2 350 648 2 998 
Cape 398 192 590 
Totals 5 886 4 825 10 711 
Table 1: Rebels captured and surrendered126 
 
Analysis of the Afrikaner Rebellion with reference to manoeuvre warfare theory 
 
The headquarters of the Union Defence Forces had the advantage of efficient intelligence 
gathering and processing during the Afrikaner Rebellion. This gave the Union forces access 
to information that made a rapid decision making cycle possible; they could then make 
maximum use of mobility and ensure surprise. 
 
The Union made use of internal lines of operations to combat the military threat of the 
Afrikaner Rebellion. It was essential for the Union Defence Forces to use railways, armoured 
trains and motorcars for internal operational movement of forces within the Union’s borders. 
In addition horses were used for tactical movement against the rebels.  
 
The armoured trains were protected with armoured plating and guns were often added for 
firepower. The armoured trains were equipped with a 12 pounder, a machinegun section and 
a searchlight.127 The horses were entrained with saddles and bridles which had the dual 
purpose of saving space and allowing for quick reaction time.128 
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Mobility on the operational and tactical level is essential for manoeuvre warfare.129 Van 
Deventer attributes his success in his operations against the rebels to the rapidity with which 
he deployed and positioned his commandos; this forced the rebels to surrender.130 
 
Furthermore, the Union Defence Forces was able to defeat the rebel forces because of their 
superior operational and tactical mobility and their rapid decision making cycle which in turn 
ensured surprise. The Union Defence Forces gained and maintained the initiative throughout 
the military operations against the rebels.  
 
It is also relevant that the rebellion provided the Union Defence Forces – especially the 
commandos – with the means to rehearse their drills and tactics. The rebels unwittingly gave 
the Union Defence Forces valuable training in the execution of operational and tactical 
movements and in the review of their battle drills before commencing with the invasion of 
German South West Africa. 
 
The Union raised 33 308 mounted troops for the rebellion and the German South West 
African campaign and 15 397 non-mounted troops.131 The rebellion gave the Union Defence 
Forces insight into its deficiencies as far as supplies were concerned and the Union Defence 
Forces subsequently acquired 20 000 Portuguese Mauser rifles and 10 000 000 rounds of 
ammunition.132    
 
After the Battle of Sandfontein and the Afrikaner Rebellion, the Union Defence Forces was 
solidified under a unified leadership structure. The re-invasion followed four axes of advance 
which resembled the initial strategic concept envisioned by Smuts.133 
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 CHAPTER 5: THE NORTHERN OFFENSIVE UNTIL 31 MARCH 1915 
 
The Union forces took Walvis Bay on 25 December 1914 without a shot fired in anger, and 
Swakopmund followed in January 1915. Colonel PCB Skinner led the initial invasion of 
Walvis Bay which was unopposed by the Germans except for sporadic skirmishing and 
some booby traps left behind.1 Botha subsequently arrived in Walvis Bay in February 1915 
and took over command of the Northern Force with the clear intention of advancing 
eastwards towards Windhoek. Botha, as prime minister of the Union was appointed as 
commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force by special commission, Section 81 of the 
Defence Act of 1912.2  
 
The amphibious landings in Walvis Bay and Lüderitzbucht meant that the Germans had a 
wide front to defend.3 Walvis Bay and Swakopmund were also extended forward bases to be 
supplied by the Union via naval support.  
 
Botha had a large number of troops at his disposal in the north, including the 1st Mounted 
Brigade under command of Brits with approximately 2 200 soldiers; the 2nd Mounted 
Brigade with approximately 2 500 soldiers under the command of Alberts; and two infantry 
brigades under the respective commands of Skinner and Colonel JS Wylie. Furthermore, 
Botha had two unabridged infantry battalions, one mounted regiment, one battery and one 
section of heavy artillery.4   
 
The main thrust of the Union Defence Forces’s strategy took place in the northern region of 
German South West Africa. The advance of the Northern Army was directed at Windhoek 
and at the headquarters of the Schutztruppe. Map 5 demonstrates the strategic situation in 
German South West Africa on 4 January 1915.    
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Map 5: Strategic situation on 4 January 19155 
 
Botha’s plan was to take Windhoek by capturing a number of intermediate German positions 
en route. The first objectives on the advance included Nonidas and Goanikontes which were 
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followed by the positions of Usakos and Husab. The first substantial defence offered by the 
German forces were the engagements at Riet, Pforte, and Jakkalsfontein.6 Map 6 indicates 
the direction of the Northern Army’s advance. . 
 
 
Map 6: Advance of the Northern Army in German South West Africa7  
 
The Union advanced on Nonidas on 23 February.8 This attack was in the form of a double 
envelopment. The Germans retreated and poisoned the wells while making their 
                                            
6  While Map 6 and Map 7 both use the name Jakkalswater (in Map 7 the spelling is 
Jakalswater) in the text of this dissertation Jakkalsfontein is used instead, which is the name 
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7  Base image for the map was taken from Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 62. The base 
image was then modified to represent the commencement of operations in the north of 
German South West Africa. 
8  Ritchie, With Botha in the Field, 32. 
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withdrawal.9 Goanikontes was one of the subsequent German positions to fall to the South 
African advance. The Germans commented that they were astonished at the extraordinary 
mobility of the South Africans.10  
 
Botha wrote to Smuts on 27 February after the capture of Nonidas and discussed the 
operational needs of the campaign. Botha replied that the horses needed fresh water and 
the soldiers required compasses for night navigation. The Germans had managed to escape 
from Nonidas because the Union cut off force commanded by Alberts had lost its way on the 
night of the operation.11 
 
Usakos was the next German position to be taken on the advance. The advance of Botha’s 
forces has since been subjected to keen debate. There were two broad options: advancing 
along the railway or along the dry riverbed of the Swakop River. Advancing without the 
railway would require many more wagons as well as oxen and mules and yet Botha 
eventually decided to use the Swakop riverbed for his advance. In doing so he sacrificed 
logistics for mobility and convention for boldness. He also displayed his faith in the abilities 
and robustness of the commandos by choosing the Swakop River for the primary advance.12 
The construction of the railway continued and became essential for the re-supply of the 
troops in the later stages of the campaign. 
 
The South African forces advanced from waterhole to waterhole along the Swakop 
riverbed.13 There were also reports which indicated that the terrain at Riet may have had 
good grazing for the horses.14 
 
The most fundamental consideration during the campaign was the shortage of water. Botha 
could only move according to the availability of this essential resource and his forces could 
only advance from water point to water point. The defensive line from Riet, Pforte and to 
Jakkalsfontein was the next logical step on the advance to Windhoek and it was also a water 
source. Ritchie says that ‘Botha’s principle task was to take an army right across the Namib 
Desert and to do that he had to capture every water-hole and keep it’.15 
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Botha expected the Germans would be in and around the Riet, Pforte, and Jakkalsfontein 
area. The Union had intercepted information to the effect that the Germans were in a strong 
position at Riet and that they had artillery support and a competent commander. Botha’s 
reaction was: ‘I shall outmanoeuvre them with flank movements’.16 
 
The expeditionary force was ready to advance by mid-March 1915. Botha had taken all the 
transport and supplies from the Northern Army and by 16 March they had five and a half 
days supplies for the advance on the Germans at Riet.17 
  
The commander-in-chief left Swakopmund at 14:30 on 18 March 1915 reaching Goanikontes 
by 23:00 that same day. Botha and his bodyguard then advanced to Husab where they 
arrived on 19 March 1915. When Botha marched he moved with great haste and as a result 
there were no luxuries for his staff. They were treated the same as the rest of the men.18  
 
On 19 March 1915, Botha moved from Husab and then proceeded with staged operations on 
the Riet, Pforte, Jakkalsfontein defensive line.19 The 1st and 2nd Mounted Brigades were 
used for the attack. Husab was the launching base from where the advance to battle 
commenced. The German’s held a strong defensive position from Riet, Pforte and to 
Jakkalsfontein, which extended for 48 kilometres.20  
 
The Germans made optimum use of the terrain and high ground and deployed 2 000 
soldiers and four artillery pieces. The Langer Heinrich hills on the eastern bank of the river 
provided a strong defensive position for the Germans.21 Furthermore, they occupied the 
Husabberg, Pforteberg and Geisberg hills to the north of the river.22  
 
The German position was well fortified and supplied between the various sections of the 
defensive line to Jakkalsfontein, where the German reserve was placed. The German 
position was particularly strong to the east and had rocky outcrops which were largely 
impregnable.23 The German right flank was on the Pforteberg mountain range and their left 
flank was on the Langer Heinrich hills.24 
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Map 7: The engagements at Riet, Pforte and Jakalswater25 
 
During the night advance from Husab to Riet, in order to promote secrecy and surprise 
Botha did not allow smoking because the glow of cigarettes could be seen for a considerable 
distance at night. Furthermore Brits’ force advanced in parallel columns so as to prevent 
raising excessive dust.26 Botha was renowned for his night marches.27  
 
The secretive advance on Riet was to be followed by an outflanking and enveloping attack 
on the defensive line (refer to Map 7). Botha wanted to attack and outflank the forces at Riet, 
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Pforte and Jakkalsfontein simultaneously so as to prevent the German forces from 
reinforcing a particular front.28 
 
The advance on Riet began at 19:00 on 19 March 1915 and proceeded through the night. 
Alberts was ordered to envelop the Pforteberg range from the north and Brits would attack 
the German position at Langer Heinrich. In the early hours of the morning of 20 March Brits’ 
scouts made contact with the German position. The initial contact was followed by the South 
African artillery engaging the German positions at Riet.29 The Transvaal Horse Artillery 
arrived at Riet at approximately 6:00 and provided accurate fire on the German position.30 
The artillery range was approximately 2.5 kilometres but the Germans struggled to bring 
their guns to bear.31 Major SS Taylor of the Transvaal Horse Artillery was cited by the 
brigade commander and received a mention (as a military decoration) for his actions at 
Riet.32 
 
Brits and his force attacked the German emplacements in the Langer Heinrich hills. They 
met stiff German resistance because their position was skilfully placed to cover direct attack. 
The Potchefstroom commando under the command of Brits made slow progress and 
managed to take a ridge en route to the German emplacements.33  
 
Commandant Bezuidenhout was sent to envelop the German position at Rietfontein. The 
map that Bezuidenhout used to navigate his route over a mountain pass turned out to be 
inaccurate. This topographical error proved disastrous and led to the failure of his attempted 
envelopment of the German position.34 Furthermore, on his return, Bezuidenhout made the 
mistake of not informing Brits or Botha or any of the other command staff that his 
envelopment had failed. Maps were issued to Van Deventer and Brits from the topographical 
branch before the military operations in German South West Africa commenced.35 The gap 
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in the mountains through which Bezuidenhout was supposed to advance simply did not 
exist. 
 
While the battle ensued, Trew requested that Botha withdraw to a safe position, which Botha 
refused to do because he felt that withdrawal might have a negative influence on the morale 
of the troops.36  
 
Brits then sent a grouping of 300 reserve troops to envelop the position at Riet but this met 
with little success due to the ruggedness of the terrain.37 The grouping was supposed to 
envelop the German left flank on the Langer Heinrich hills but failed to do so. The clash at 
Riet was essentially a deadlock, the day ending with an attrition-like artillery shelling of 
alternate positions. The Germans were in a strong position at Riet and it was not feasible to 
attack directly through the Langer Heinrich hills.  
 
Brits was waiting for Bezuidenhout to turn the German position which did not happen due to 
erroneous terrain intelligence. The artillery duel continued38 and the attack remained 
relatively stationary.39 Botha’s chief fear was not getting water at Riet because this would 
have completely disabled his fighting force. By 18:30 on 20 March, the fighting died down 
considerably which gave the soldiers and horses a chance to rest and get adequate water 
supplies.40 The Union forces eventually found water by digging in the Swakop riverbed. 
Many of the Union forces had to move to Gawieb to get sufficient water and Botha and his 
bodyguard moved two kilometres away along the road from Riet to Husab where they 
encamped for the night.41 The Germans withdrew under the cover of night as a result of the 
action at Pforte.42  
 
Alberts was having a much more successful day around Pforte. He sent the Standerton and 
Ermelo commandos to engage the Germans directly at Pforte while he sent Swarts’ scouts 
and two other commandos through the gap between Hussabberg and Pforteberg. The 
commandos hurried through under artillery fire from the Germans. The move was done in 
rapid fashion and enabled the railway between Pforte and Jakkalsfontein to be cut, thereby 
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isolating the forward German detachments.43 The envelopment cut the German 
communications to the west of Jakkalsfontein.44  
 
Alberts captured the entire force at Pforteberg,45 including 260 soldiers, all their weaponry, 
two guns and two Maxim machineguns.46 The success of the manoeuvre was attributed to 
the swiftness of the commandos.47 The German mounted troops tried to intercept them but 
did not manage to do so because the commandos covered almost 13 kilometres in 30 
minutes.48   
 
While the battle at Riet ensued, the commando wing of Commandant Collins’ force was 
successfully engaging the German forces at Jakkalsfontein. Collins’ men pursued the fleeing 
Germans but they responded with strong and direct artillery fire on the commandos, forcing 
them to withdraw leaving 43 soldiers as prisoners of war.49 These men had their horses shot 
down and were thus left stranded.  
 
The German commander at Pforte said that the South Africans came at them from all sides, 
especially from behind and that they were firing from the saddle.50 The action at Pforte 
culminated in an artillery duel. Captain JF Wolmarans commander of the 4th Permanent 
Battery of the South African Mounted Rifles was commended for his actions at Pforte and 
was cited for the Distinguished Service Order medal.51 The Germans eventually surrendered 
at 15:00 on 20 March 1915 because their lines of retreat and communications were cut. The 
total loss for the South African forces was 13 dead, 41 wounded and 43 prisoners of war. 
German losses amounted to 16 dead, 21 wounded and 264 prisoners of war.52  
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Following the occupation of Riet, important documents were found which stated that for the 
most part the Germans were concentrated in the north of the colony. Information was also 
found on plans for German minefields and the intention to poison water wells.53 
 
A German commander told Trew that he was surprised at how fast the South Africans could 
advance. The Germans had calculated that it should have taken another day to set up a 
forward supply base at Husab and that it was unimaginable that the Union would press 
forward without lines of communication and only limited supplies.54 The tactical surprise was 
crucial to the South African victory and can also be regarded as a German intelligence 
failure. 
 
There were good water wells at Riet and it became a forward supply depot for the South 
African forces from which further advances would be launched.55 These water wells were left 
intact by the Germans – but not for a lack of trying. The German engineer section that was 
sent to destroy the wells following their retreat from Riet was shot down by two commando 
scouts.56  
 
At this stage the commandos and the rest of the forces did not have the logistical 
requirements to pursue the Germans.57 The horses of the South African commandos were 
exhausted (refer to Figure 5) and thus the victory at Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein could not 
be exploited by pursuing the Germans any further.58  
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Figure 5: Horse and soldier exhausted in the desert59 
 
The Germans’ secret code was found at Pforte which assisted the South African forces in 
deciphering encoded German messages.60 This proved a crucial find because it allowed the 
South African forces to decrypt German messages about the movement of their forces. 
 
After the victory at Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein on 20 March until the end of April 1915 
there was very little activity in the northern part of German South West Africa. Botha and the 
South African forces waited for supplies that were necessary for the advance on Windhoek.  
 
Analysis of the northern operations until the Battle of the Riet, Pforte and 
Jakkalsfontein with regard to manoeuvre warfare theory  
 
Botha was the commander-in-chief of South Africa’s expeditionary force in German South 
West Africa as well as prime minister of the Union. Because of his unique position he had a 
clear idea of what was needed on the different levels of war. He understood the needs of the 
campaign on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Botha had alluded to the strategic 
importance of the campaign when he addressed parliament to appeal for approval of the 
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campaign.61 The strategic objectives of the Union were linked to British war aims. The Union, 
as a British dominion, thus pursued the strategic objectives as outlined by Britain’s war 
effort. 
 
There was a merging of the strategic and operational levels of war. Botha (prime minister) 
and Smuts (minister of defence and acting prime minister while Botha was on campaign) 
were in political control and also in military command of the Union. Thus the operational and 
strategic levels of war were amalgamated. Their respective objectives at these levels aimed 
at the German centre of gravity which was the Schutztruppe headquarters. If this was 
neutralised, control of the colony and the defeat of the German forces would ensue. Military 
strategy was thus a means to attain political ends and not merely for military objectives. The 
political ends included the imperial objectives dictated by the British war strategy which 
would be achieved by defeating the German military force.  
 
Sun argues that politicians should not command soldiers because this leads to confusion.62 
He claims that soldiers are tentative when politicians command the military. However, in the 
case of the German South West Africa campaign Botha was an exception; he was well 
suited to command the military force because of his previous experience and abilities. 
 
Botha did not focus on the tactical level; instead he kept his aim firmly fixed on the 
operational objectives of the campaign. Botha and Smuts through their dual roles as political 
and military leaders centralised the strategic and operational levels, thereby uniting the 
intentions and efforts of the Union’s forces. Botha wanted the campaign to be concluded as 
rapidly as possible because of the political pressures in the Union at the time. According to 
Sun a country never benefits from extended war, because of the loss of soldiers’ morale and 
the financial expense of military operations.63  
 
The Union Defence Forces advanced on four divergent axes. By advancing on separate 
routes it weakened the German forces and prevented them from linking up and operating 
their internal lines effectively. Map 8 is a representation of the divergent lines of advance. 
                                            
61  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 14. 
62  Sun, tr. Sadler, The Art of War, 6. 
63  Ibid., 4. 
77 
 
Map 8: Union Defence Forces axes of advance64 
 
Graph 1 demonstrates the strength of the different forces on their respective axes of 
advance. The numerical superiority of the Union forces allowed for the deployment of troops 
and materiel on four divergent axes.  
 
                                            
64  Base image for the map was taken from Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 62. The base 
image was then modified to represent the Union Defence Force’s axes of advance in German 
South West Africa. 
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Graph 1: Strength of the Eastern, Southern, Central and Northern forces (including forces in 
field and en route to the theatre of operations)65 
 
The events at Riet, if taken in isolation, could be regarded as attrition based. The 
envelopments at Pforte however qualify the battle throughout the entire defensive line as 
congruent with the principles of manoeuvre warfare. The battle at Riet and Pforte began as a 
direct attack on Riet. The terrain prevented the turning of the German left flank and thus the 
engagement resulted in a stalemate. The terrain at Pforte lent itself to extensive movements 
and the mobility of the commandos.66 
 
The Union Defence Forces’s attack on the German forces at Pforte and Jakkalsfontein can 
be regarded as an envelopment of the German forces at Riet. The German forces at Riet 
were thus cut off and had they stayed in position they would have been surrounded. As a 
result of this envelopment, the forces at Riet withdrew.  
 
Botha allowed his forces to operate on their own initiative in a decentralised fashion. They 
knew what the objective was and they used their initiative in realising it. The forces that 
enveloped the position of Pforte and Jakkalsfontein robbed the German forces at Riet of the 
initiative and forced them to retreat. Map 9 shows the strategic situation in German South 
West Africa on 20 March 1915. 
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Map 9: Strategic situation on 20 March 191567 
 
After the defeat of the Germans at Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein, the Union Defence 
Forces did not have the logistical requirements to pursue the Germans. This led to an 
operational pause to build up enough stock to continue operations in the north of German 
South West Africa. 
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 CHAPTER 6 THE SOUTHERN ARMY: CENTRAL, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN FORCES 
 
The Southern Army was a combination of ‘C’ Force (which later became the Central Force) 
and the Southern and Eastern forces. The aim of the Southern Army was to capture 
Kalkfontein, Aus, Keetmanshoop and Gibeon to nullify the German force’s ability to 
concentrate its forces in the south of the colony. 
 
The force at Lüderitzbucht, originally ‘C’ Force, landed on the night of 18 September 1914 
and was led by Colonel PS Beves. Expecting to receive resistance from the Germans, 
Beves deployed a small force to envelop the German port and cut its railway line to force a 
retreat.1 Despite the South African force’s plans, Lüderitzbucht was taken unopposed when 
the Germans withdrew.  
 
Beves’ force comprised the 1st Transvaal Scottish, the Witwatersrand Rifles, one squadron 
of the Imperial Light Horse, and 7 guns from the 7th Citizen Force Battery.2 Its total strength 
was approximately 1 824 soldiers.3 ‘C’ Force took the German post at Grasplatz on 26 
September without much incident. The Germans had withdrawn from the vicinity of the coast 
towards Aus and had destroyed the railway piecemeal during their retreat as a means to 
slow down the South African advance. It was later discovered that the Germans were 
concentrating their efforts on Sandfontein. 
 
General D Mackenzie took command of the force at Lüderitzbucht in October 1914, after 
which it became known as the Central Force. The Union forces took Tschaukaib on 8 
November 1914 and then in mid-December attempted to take Garub where they were 
repulsed by the Germans who put up a stout defence. Mackenzie’s force then returned to 
Tschaukaib.4 The Union planned to capture Aus, Keetmanshoop and Gibeon.  
 
The strength of Mackenzie’s force on 22 December was 2 183 mounted men and 5 754 
infantrymen .5 The Southern Force was opposed by the German force commander, Major 
Ritter, who had a battery of artillery and four mounted regiments. He also had the support of 
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Maritz with approximately 800 rebels.6 The German force was estimated at about 1 000 
soldiers. 
 
 
Map 10: German South West Africa7 
 
Mackenzie’s force numbered 10 830 on 24 March 1915 of whom 3 842 were mounted 
soldiers and 5 777 were infantrymen.8 Mackenzie had two field batteries of artillery, along 
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with two mounted brigades. A third brigade was sent in early March 1915 as were seven 
infantry battalions and two batteries of heavy artillery.9 Graph 2 demonstrates the increase in 
troops of the Central Force from September 1914 until March 1915.  
 
 
Graph 2: Central Force increase in troops (including the forces in the field and 1 815 soldiers 
en route in March 1915)10 
 
The Southern and Eastern forces that deployed from Upington and Kakamas were 
commanded by Van Deventer (Southern Force) and Colonel CAL Berrange (Eastern Force) 
respectively. Berrange had four mounted regiments and one section of heavy artillery under 
his charge, while Van Deventer had one battery of heavy artillery and 29 commandos. Van 
Deventer’s force had a numerical strength of 6 958 men, of whom 6 176 were mounted 
soldiers.11 
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Berrange’s force comprised mounted riflemen to the strength of 1 992 men.12 Both forces 
were supported by a small section of artillery and their rendezvous point was 
Keetmanshoop.13 The Southern and Eastern forces formed part of the invasion force that 
would cross the German South West African border and link up with the Central Force, thus 
forming part of the Southern Army. Smuts assumed overall command of the Southern Army 
in April 1915.  
 
Berrange moved from Kakamas to Kuruman and then travelled 403 kilometres from 
Kuruman to the German South West African border, crossing in March 1915. An advanced 
logistical system was put in place with advanced water points established by motor vehicles 
to facilitate the movement of the mounted men.14 The mechanical transport section of the 
Eastern Force kept the advanced troops supplied with water and equipment by driving vast 
distances from the Union to the front lines. They were exposed to substantial risk because 
the extended communication lines they had to drive through were generally unprotected and 
were susceptible to German ambushes.15 
 
Berrange advanced from Kuruman and forced the Germans to abandon Kiries West on 16 
March 1915. Furthermore one of Berrange’s sections took Rietfontein on 19 March 1915 
with only a minor skirmish.16 The Eastern Force used the Kalahari Horse as its scouts for 
forward reconnaissance. They did excellent work and were highly commended for their 
speed, scouting and ability to conduct efficient mobile warfare.17  
 
Van Deventer marched from Upington in late February 1915. His first objectives as he 
headed into German South West Africa were Schuit Drift and Nakob. The advance of the 
mounted forces across the Kalahari ensured that the fording points on the Orange River 
were occupied.18  
 
The mounted troops under Van Deventer, who had captured Schuit Drift, numbered 1 364 
men. There were also ten artillerymen and 154 administrative staff. The administrative staff 
                                            
12  DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 150, Strengths, General Summary, Eastern Force 14 
April 1915. 
13  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 142. 
14  Anon., Official History, 57; DOD Archives, WW1 GSWA, Box 20, Report, Berrange’s report on 
the operations of the Eastern Force, 15 May 1915. 
15  DOD Archives, WW1 GSWA, Box 23a, Citations, German South West Africa, Southern Army 
Eastern Force Mechanical Transport, 17 February 1918. 
16  Anon., Official History, 81. 
17  DOD Archives, WW1 GSWA, Box 23a, Citations, German South West Africa, Southern Army 
Eastern Force Kalahari Horse, 17 February 1918. 
18  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 153. 
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included an army post office, field cashier, an engineering section, pioneers, a telegraph 
corps, and also staff to deal with transport, remounts, ordinance, sanitation and supplies.19 
Van Deventer took Nakob with little resistance on 26 February 1915.20 Van Deventer’s force 
advanced at a rapid pace and one of his detachments took Nabas on 8 March 1915. The 
German commander at Nabas retreated after resisting for half a day and leaving all his 
supplies and transport behind. Van Deventer’s brother, Colonel D van Deventer, took 
Platbeen on 27 March and the German commander retreated, leaving behind fourteen 
prisoners of war.21  
 
While the central force pushed forward, Botha went to see Mackenzie on 29 March 1915 to 
discuss the necessity of his advance on Aus (refer to Map 11). The Germans subsequently 
evacuated Aus on 31 March 191522 so the South African forces took Aus unopposed. The 
Official History states that Aus was evacuated due to strategic pressure within German 
South West Africa.23 
 
Map 11: Mackenzie’s advance24 
 
Van Deventer took Kalkfontein on 5 April 1915. The Germans had assumed a strong 
position in the Karas Mountains outside Kalkfontein, but Van Deventer deployed a double 
                                            
19  DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 150, Strengths, Southern Force at Steinkopf, 23 
February 1915. 
20  Dane, British Campaigns in Africa and the Pacific 1914–1918, 50. 
21  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 52–54. 
22  Ibid., 79. 
23  Anon., Official History, 47. 
24  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 206. 
85 
envelopment that forced them to retreat. After putting up a brief fight the Germans withdrew 
to Keetmanshoop.25     
 
Kalkfontein was an important military base for the Germans and it was also a railway 
junction which allowed the South Africans access to the German railway systems that joined 
the major towns in German South West Africa and thus provided the Union with improved 
operational mobility. 
 
The number of men under Berrange and Van Deventer totalled 8 950 on 14 April 1915. All 
the fighting soldiers were mounted and totalled 7 506, while the remainder were 
administrative and supporting personnel.26  
 
On 16 April 1915 Smuts took over the command of the entire Union force at Kalkfontein, with 
Berrange and Van Deventer’s forces linking up. Mackenzie’s command was superseded by 
that of Smuts. Smuts remained in command until the capture of Gibeon. 
 
Analysis of the operations of the Southern, Eastern and Central forces with reference 
to manoeuvre warfare theory 
 
The divergent advances of the Central, Southern and Eastern forces in the south of German 
South West Africa show characteristics of manoeuvre warfare. These diverging advances 
robbed the German forces of all initiative.  
 
The German force had previously demonstrated its prowess by using internal lines to 
concentrate a large military force on Sandfontein. The option of using internal lines in the 
south was nullified for the Germans by the Union Defence Forces’s various advances along 
divergent axes. Had the Germans considered concentrating their forces on one of the 
Union’s advancing groupings, they would have risked being enveloped and cut off by one of 
the Union’s other advancing forces.  
 
The German force therefore had little option in terms of seeking out and defeating the Union 
Defence Forces piecemeal. Map 12 shows the various lines of advance of the Central, 
Southern and Eastern forces. The German response to the advancing Union forces was to 
withdraw from Aus and Kalkfontein to Keetmanshoop. 
                                            
25  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 151–154. 
26  DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 150, Strengths, General Summary, 14 April 1915.  
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Map 12: Divergent advance of the Union Defence Forces in the south of German South 
West Africa27 
 
In addition to the difficulties the Union forces posed by advancing along different axes, the 
German forces were also heavily outnumbered in the south. They had approximately 1 000 
soldiers in the south of the colony. Graph 3 demonstrates the numerical superiority of the 
South African forces. 
 
The Central Force was relatively inactive in the capture of Aus. The Germans withdrew from 
Aus due to the overall operational situation in the south of the colony. Their position at Aus 
was untenable because they faced the possibility of being enveloped and cut off by the 
Southern and Eastern forces. Graph 4 indicates the disparity between mounted and non-
mounted soldiers as part of the Southern, Eastern and Central forces. The mounted soldiers 
provided a high degree of mobility. 
 
                                            
27  Base image for the map was taken from Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 62. The base 
image was then modified to represent the operations in the south of German South West 
Africa. 
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Graph 3: Strength of the Southern Army (Central, Southern and Eastern forces) by 
March1915 (inclusive of the forces in the field and 5 895 soldiers en route)28 
 
 
Graph 4: Comparison between mounted and non-mounted soldiers in the Central and 
Southern and Eastern forces (inclusive of the forces in the field and en route)29 
 
The above graphs include 1 815 mounted soldiers (destined to join the Central Force) and  
4 080 mounted soldiers (for the Southern Force) who were still mobilising for the operation.30 
The Southern and Eastern forces were highly mobile due to the large number of mounted 
                                            
28  Bar graph compiled from DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 150, Strengths, General 
Summary Central Force, 24 March 1915. 
29  DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 150, Strengths, General Summary Central Force, 24 
March 1915. 
30  Ibid. 
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soldiers. Their high mobility and rapid advance were inversely proportional to the cautious 
approach of the Central Force. Their rapid advance gave the Germans less time to consider 
defence alternatives. The rapid and divergent advances of the South African forces ensured 
that the initiative stayed with the Union Defence Forces.  
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 7 THE CONTINUATION OF OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH OF GERMAN 
SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
 
The Union forces in the south took Kalkfontein on 5 April 1915, which allowed the South 
African railway line in Prieska to be joined to the one in Kalkfontein.1 The German forces 
thus evacuated Aus and Kalkfontein and retreated to Kabus and Keetmanhoop. 
 
Berrange and Van Deventer arranged for a cut-off force to envelop the German position 
north of Keetmanshoop on 19 April 1915. Kabus was subsequently taken on 20 April 1915 
with the cooperation of Van Deventer and Berrange’s forces. On the same day the German 
forces retreated from Kabus and Keetmanshoop to Gibeon.2  
 
Mackenzie’s force advanced from Aus on 14 April in pursuit of the Germans and arrived in 
Gibeon less than two weeks later.3 The 8th and 9th Mounted Brigades with a section of the 
12th Permanent Battery of the South African Mounted Rifles took Berseba just south of 
Gibeon on 22 April along with 20 German prisoners.4 The German force which retreated 
from Berseba united with the main German force in Gibeon. Smuts wrote to Botha from Aus 
to inform him that the Germans were retreating at a rapid pace and he doubted whether they 
would be able to catch up to them.5  
 
On 26 April 1915 as the South African force approached Gibeon they tapped the telegraph 
line at Grundorns which the German force had left uncut. The Union Defence Forces 
received valuable information in the form of the German plan for the evacuation of Gibeon.6 
The Germans were planning to retreat northwards by train. 
 
The German evacuation was planned for that particular evening, 26 April 1915. Captain HO 
von Kleist was the officer in charge of the German retreat. Mackenzie immediately put plans 
in place to cut off the German retreat by placing a force behind Gibeon to blow up the 
                                            
1  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 72. 
2  DOD Archives, WW1 GSWA, Box 20, Report, Berrange’s report on the operations of the 
Eastern Force, 15 May 1915. 
3  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 72. 
4  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915; Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 88; 
Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 3. 
5  Hancock and Van der Poel eds., Selections from the Smuts Papers, 272. 
6  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915. 
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railway line.7 Lieutenant Colonel JR Royston, affectionately known as Galloping Jack, was 
sent with one regiment of the 8th Mounted Brigade, supplemented by a grouping of the 9th 
Mounted Brigade, to cut off the German retreat behind Gibeon. A scouting party and 
engineer section was also sent to destroy the railway north of Gibeon. Royston received 
orders to go wide around to the east of the German position and then close in so as to place 
his force astride the German line of retreat.8 
 
Galloping Jack had placed his forces in the open and as a result they were easily discovered 
and defeated by the Germans who enfiladed their position with machinegun fire. The 
position was poorly selected in terms of its ability to provide cover and defence from enfilade 
fire.9 The total losses were 24 killed and 48 wounded.10 Although Royston managed to 
retreat, 70 of his soldiers were captured by the Germans.11 
 
                                            
7  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915; L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 212; Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 3. 
8  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915; Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 89. 
9  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915; Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 3. 
10  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 217. Refer to page 92 for the German losses. 
11  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915. 
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Map 13: The advance on Gibeon12 
 
The German victory was short lived because Mackenzie launched a frontal attack with a 
double envelopment on the morning of 27 April 1915 which sent the Germans into full retreat 
(refer to Map 13). Galloping Jack’s prisoners of war were recovered in the running fight 
which ensued.13 The cavalrymen and commandos were in hot pursuit and Von Kleist left a 
rearguard to cover his withdrawal. After their rapid advance from Aus the South African 
force’s horses were exhausted. The Union forces had covered 320 kilometres in 12 days to 
converge on the German forces at Gibeon.14  
 
                                            
12  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 216. 
13  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915. 
14  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 91, 92. 
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This was a great feat of mobility. A German soldier who had fought at Gibeon commented 
that the South African soldiers were the bravest and worst equipped soldiers and that given 
the choice he would prefer to fight any other troops rather than the South Africans.15  
 
Collyer maintains that the German withdrawal from Gibeon was not related to the actions of 
Mackenzie’s force. Instead, in his view it was the result of the overall strategic situation.16 
The final tallies for the Battle of Gibeon, including the losses suffered by Galloping Jack’s 
regiment, were 27 killed and 61 wounded. Royston’s prisoners of war were recovered. The 
Germans had 11 dead, 30 wounded and 188 taken as prisoners of war.17  
 
Analysis of the operations in the south of German South West Africa until the Battle 
of Gibeon, with reference to manoeuvre warfare 
 
The Eastern and Southern forces captured Kalkfontein which resulted in the retreat of the 
German forces stationed there. The capture of Kalkfontein communicated sufficient threat of 
envelopment to the German forces at Aus and they withdrew to Keetmanshoop. This town 
was subsequently taken and the Germans retreated to Gibeon. The Union Defence Forces 
attempted to cut off the German force at Gibeon but after giving battle the German force 
escaped.  
 
The German retreat in the south was a result of the overall operational situation in German 
South West Africa. Botha’s advance and capture of the Riet, Pforte, Jakkalsfontein defensive 
line in the north made the Germans aware of the mobility of the South African forces. The 
South African threat in the north was very prominent and the Germans chose to abandon 
their defence in the south in favour of a northerly defence.  
 
Map 14 shows the results of operations in German South West Africa until 3 May 1915. The 
entire southern area of German South West Africa was under the control of the Union 
Defence Forces at this stage although operations in the north continued until late April 1915. 
 
                                            
15 Walker, A Doctor’s Diary in Damaraland, 175. 
16  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 92. 
17  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915. 
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Map 14: Result of the South African actions up to 3 May 191518  
 
The Schutztruppe headquarters only deployed a force of approximately 800 men in the 
south.19 This was mere token resistance. The German defensive strategy was to withdraw 
                                            
18  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, opposite 105. 
19  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Operations of the Central Force from 15 to 27 April 1915 including the action at Gibeon 
station, 15 May 1915. 
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until a suitable time and place where they could deliver a decisive blow to the South African 
forces.20 Map 15 indicates the strategic situation in the north of the colony on 6 May 1915. 
 
 
Map 15: Strategic situation in the north of German South West Africa on 6 May 191521 
 
When analysing the final operations in the south in the light of the competing theories of 
attrition and manoeuvre, a superficial view might lead one to argue that it was the superiority 
in numbers alone that led to the German retreat. The final battle did not take place in the 
south of German South West Africa but was planned for the north where the German forces 
had more resources. The defensive posture of the German forces; the Union Defence 
Forces’s divergent advances on three axes in the south; and the Union’s advance in the 
north, all played a role in the retreat of the German forces to Gibeon and then further north to 
Windhoek.  
                                            
20  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Translation of an appeal by Lieutenant Colonel Franke, the commander-in-chief of the 
Protectorate, 28 June 1915. 
21  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138 IO, General Botha’s Despatch (GOC MC GSW 
Campaign) 9 July to 28 October 1920, Historical Record of the Campaign in German South 
West Africa, 4 November 1919. 
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However, the value of superior numbers should not be completely negated. The quantitative 
value of a military force must be evaluated in relation to and interaction with qualitative 
factors such as the doctrine, organisational qualities, values as well as strategy and tactics 
of the opposing forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 8: THE FINAL ENVELOPMENT 
 
The fall of Gibeon and the retreat of the German forces signalled the advance of the 
Northern Army on Karibib and Windhoek on 26 April 1915. The German forces in the south 
were retreating in a northerly direction towards Karibib following their defeat at Gibeon. 
Botha attempted to intercept them with a rapid advance on Karibib before they could 
amalgamate with their forces in the north. Karibib was the railway junction which connected 
the south of German South West Africa to the north.  
 
The same date, 26 April 1915, was also significant because it marked the day that the 
Germans attempted to capture Trekkoppies, a railway post in the northern region of German 
South West Africa that was part of the Union Defence Forces’s northerly lines of 
communication. The Germans attacked the Union Defence Forces position at Trekkoppies 
with infantry and artillery.1 The German attack was intended to delay the general advance of 
the South African forces but they put up a stout defence and managed to repulse the attack. 
  
The defence of Trekkoppies took place while Botha was busy planning his advance on 
Windhoek, the capital of German South West Africa. An intelligence report came in that 
confirmed that the Germans were concentrated in the north of the country in and around 
Karibib.2 Karibib was an intermediate objective en route to capture Windhoek.3 The advance 
on Karibib was also intended to stop the northern and southern German forces from 
amalgamating.4 Botha planned a cross country advance to capture Karibib and Windhoek 
which required wagons and mules for the transportation of the logistical needs of the 
soldiers. 
 
The Union forces were in dire need of logistics to complete the campaign. Botha had 
sufficient stores to supply his commandos for five days on the advance. He appealed to 
parliament to make funds available for mules and wagons and his request was duly 
approved in April 1915 when parliament agreed to fund the provision of 300 wagons and 
mules for the advance on Windhoek.5  
 
The logistical support of the mounted units was thereby increased from 59 ammunition 
wagons, 110 wagons and 51 water carts on 1 March 1915, to 86 ammunition wagons, 376 
                                            
1  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 74; Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 6. 
2  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 95. 
3  Anon., Official History, 29. 
4  Trew, Botha Treks, 121. 
5  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 244. 
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wagons and 165 water carts on 12 April 1915 (refer to Graph 5).6 Walker notes in his diary 
that in April 1915 the transport officer was sending out 737 088kg of supplies per week to the 
forward troops at Riet.7 
 
 
Graph 5: Increase in Union Defence Forces logistical support8 
 
Botha made use of Brits and Myburgh to take charge of the two groupings that he deployed 
to take Karibib and Windhoek.9 Despite the best efforts of the Union Defence Forces, the 
German forces managed to unite and retreat north-eastwards. 
 
Karibib was taken with little incident and Botha accepted its formal surrender on 6 May 1915. 
The official surrender of Windhoek was received by Botha on 12 May 1915 which also 
achieved the strategic objective of capturing its wireless station which the Germans had 
dissembled on their own initiative.10 
 
The Germans retreated from Windhoek to Tsumeb which was also the location of their last 
remaining wireless station. Botha then built up forces and logistics for six weeks from mid-
May until mid-June in preparation for the final advance.11 Furthermore the Union Aviation 
Corps arrived in German South West Africa on 1 May 1915 and the first aeroplane was sent 
from Walvis Bay to Karibib on 26 May 1915.12  
                                            
6  DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 182, Mounted Strengths, Field state, 12 April 1915. 
7  Walker, A Doctor’s Diary in Damaraland, 56.  
8  DOD Archives, AG 1914–1921, Box 182, Mounted Strengths, Field state, 12 April 1915. 
9  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 244; 
10  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 74; Anon., Official History, 40; Meintjes, General Louis 
Botha, 264; Whittal, With Botha and Smuts in Africa, 62; Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 6. 
11  Anon., Official History, 32. 
12  DOD Archives, World War 1 War Diaries (hereafter WW1 WD), Box 2, Air/1/1247/204/7/4, 
Historical record of No 26 (SA) Squadron and South Africa Aviation Corps and Historical 
record of the South Africa unit of the Royal Flying Corps; DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, 
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The date of the final advance was calculated in terms of how fast the engineers could rebuild 
the railway.13 Between 5 and 14 May 1915 the South African forces were seriously 
hampered by a lack of rations and supplies.14 The logistical planning involved the 
reconstruction of the railway which was completely rebuilt from Swakopmund to Karibib by 
15 May 1915.15 Botha refused to embark on the final offensive until the railway and supply 
situation was completely resolved.16 
 
The Union Defence Forces managed to get 20 000 animals from the Union government with 
two to three days supplies for the final advance.17 In June 1915 the government also 
provided more wagons for the final advance, part of an allocation of 432 wagons to the 
respective deploying forces.18 
 
The plan for the final envelopment involved Lukin and Beves advancing along the railway 
with Brits and the 1st Mounted Brigade enveloping Etosha Pan and taking Namutoni. 
Myburgh, with the 2nd Mounted Brigade was to take Grootfontein and Manie Botha, with the 
3rd Mounted Brigade, was instructed to advance parallel to the railway to offer support to 
both enveloping forces.19 Map 16 shows the final envelopments in German South West 
Africa. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Reports of Force Commanders in German South West Africa, Despatch number 4 by General 
Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
13  Whittal, With Botha and Smuts in Africa, 86. 
14  Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 6. 
15  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 147. 
16  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915; 
Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 114. 
17  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 74. 
18  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
19  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915; 
L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 264. 
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Map 16: The final envelopment in German South West Africa20 
 
The Union’s forces were also re-organised to protect the lines of communication. The left 
wing of the 3rd Mounted Brigade was deployed to Windhoek for the purpose of protecting 
Botha’s lines of communication during the final advance.21 
 
The final offensive against the last German position was made by 5 250 mounted men and 4 
750 infantrymen with 32 artillery weapons pitted against 4 750 German soldiers in well 
defended positions with superior firepower in terms of artillery and machineguns.22 Botha 
wrote to Smuts on 15 June 1915, stating that the chances of early success on the campaign 
were dependent on whether the Germans decided to fight or retreat. Botha also explained 
that there were reports coming in of the Germans being in well fortified positions at Kalkveld, 
but he added that the Germans had previously evacuated well prepared positions without 
fighting.23 
 
                                            
20  Base image for the map was taken from Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 62. The base 
image was then modified to represent final envelopment in German South West Africa. 
21  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
22  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, 287. 
23  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
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The advance started on 18 June 1915.24 Collyer did well to organise the watering of the 
columns on the advance. He had the quality and quantity of the water tested on the routes of 
advance. He then staggered the Union’s advance which allowed sections of the advancing 
columns to be watered piecemeal.25 The Union forces were relatively well supplied, although 
for only a short duration, which allowed for the temporary use of their full mobility.26  
 
The infantry reached Karibib and the commandos were deployed in a semicircle from Karibib 
to Windhoek. Lukin’s 6th Mounted Brigade was deployed at Usakos; Brits and the 1st 
Mounted Brigade were deployed at Klein Aus; the 1st Infantry Brigade under Beves was at 
Erongo; Manie Botha was at Hohe with the 5th Mounted Brigade; and Myburgh held 
positions between Wilhelmstal and Okassise with a wing each of the 2nd and 3rd Mounted 
Brigades.27 
 
Brits and Myburgh’s forces were sent to cut off the retreat of the Germans by committing to 
extensive movements and independent actions. Myburgh went via Waterberg to Tsumeb to 
cut off the possibility of a north-easterly retreat and Brits was sent with his commando to 
Etosha Pan to the north of Namutoni which prevented a German retreat northwards. In other 
words, the planned envelopments of the German forces were intended to prevent them from 
retiring further northwards.28 Meanwhile Lukin moved forward with the infantry at snail’s pace 
with the Germans systematically retreating.29  
 
The headquarters of the Union Defence Forces and the motorcars were at the rear of the 
convoy and the cars were used to rush between the mounted columns to ensure 
communication. The idea of the broad turning movement by Brits was attractive to Botha 
because it also allowed for the prisoners at Namutoni30 to be set free.31  
 
                                            
24  Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 267; Whittal, With Botha and Smuts in Africa, 95; Paterson 
gives the date for the start of the advance as 20 June 1915: Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 7. 
25  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915; 
Trew, Botha Treks, 154. 
26  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 125. 
27  Paterson, ‘First Allied Victory’, 7. 
28  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
29  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, 75. 
30  These prisoners of war include the South Africans captured at the battles of Sandfontein and 
the engagements at the Riet, Pforte, Jakkalsfontein amongst others. 
31  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915; 
Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, 124.  
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Brits took Omaruru on 19 June 1915.32 The advance moved from Omaruru to Kalkfeld where 
it was thought that the Germans would put up a defensive battle. The Union central column 
then advanced to Otjiwarongo.33 Whitall advanced from Etiro to Omaruru by 21 June 1915 
and then on to Epako on 22 June 1915, where the German fortified positions were found 
abandoned.34  
 
Lukin was in command of the assault on Kalkveld and the brigade bivouacked in 
Okosongora and departed on the morning of 24 June 1914.35 Reconnaissance was carried 
out by the budding Union Aviation Corps but their feedback was unclear regarding the 
deployment of the German forces at Kalkfeld and Botha assumed that the Germans were 
still in position.36 Botha was reportedly quite impressed by the value of aeroplanes in warfare 
and mentioned that every support should be given to developing the use of aviation in 
combat.37 Manie Botha captured Kalkveld unopposed on 24 June 1915.38  
 
While Botha moved up country in pursuit of the Germans, Mackenzie had arrived at 
Rehoboth from the south and by 25 June many of his sick soldiers had been admitted to the 
field hospital in Windhoek.39 The north-south railway between Karibib and Keetmanshoop 
was also operational and assisted the Union Defence Forces with an extra 200 tonnage of 
supply per day.40 
 
Meanwhile, the Germans were preparing a string of defensive positions spanning Otavi and 
Tsumeb. Ritter was deployed at Otavifontein with ten machineguns and three artillery pieces 
and Von Kleist was positioned between Otavi and Grootfontein to protect the eastern flank of 
the German position.41  
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The Germans had a strong defensive line and the terrain was well suited for ambushes with 
areas of dense bush and also open plains.42 The scouts in the vanguard and the flank guard 
minimised the threat of ambush on the Union’s main force.43 The terrain in the hinterland 
had changed from the sandy soil found on the coast and in the Namib Desert to a low 
bushveld type of terrain. The South African soldiers were more accustomed to this type of 
terrain.44   
 
During the final envelopments Botha understood the probability that he would lose contact 
with Myburgh.45 The Union forces were advancing over a front of 95 kilometres which was 
extensive.46 Myburgh deployed from Wilhelmstal in a wide envelopment to take Grootfontein. 
Botha allowed Myburgh out on his own initiative because he trusted the instincts of Myburgh, 
who understood that a rapid and sustained pursuit of the enemy was required. Furthermore, 
Myburgh understood the plan and the intent of his commander-and-chief.47  
 
Whittal deployed with his armoured cars to Okanjande and then on to Otjiwarongo which 
was approximately 48 kilometres from Kalkveld.48 The Union’s advance reached 
Otjiwarongo on 26 June 1915.49 
 
Lukin and Myburgh, with their infantry and mounted brigades respectively, deployed to 
Omarassa from Otjiwarongo on 27 June 1915.50 Botha advanced with the main force and 
ordered a halt to the advance at Omarassa because part of the Union’s force was lagging 
behind. Botha wanted to consolidate his forces to ensure an effective march on Otavi which 
was 64 kilometres from Omarassa. The forced march on Otavi commenced on the night of 
30 June.51  
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An intelligence report came in which unequivocally confirmed the German presence in the 
north in and around Otavi and Otavifontein, so Botha and the Union forces rode throughout 
the night of 30 June and early hours of 1 July 1915.52  
 
On 1 July 1915 the main force of the Union’s advance managed to secure Otavi. Brits was 
en route to Namutoni whereas Myburgh was heading towards the north of Grootfontein.53 
Botha advised Brits to take an ambulance with him but Brits refused, arguing ‘if I take an 
ambulance the men will see it and imagine themselves sick and soon it will be full’.54 Each 
brigade was organised to be self sufficient in terms of an ambulance with medical personnel 
and was divided into a left and right wing which in turn corresponded with the two wings of 
the mounted brigade.55 Botha complained that the medical services struggled to keep up 
with the pace of the commandos.56  
 
Franke ordered Ritter to hold out at Otavifontein for at least a week to allow for time to 
prepare the defences at Tsumeb. The Union forces swooped upon the German defences at 
Otavifontein on 1 July 1915.57 The Germans retreated from Osib to the Elefantenberg with 
the Union Defence Forces in pursuit. The Germans put up a brief fight in their retreat 
towards the Otaviberg and Elefantenberg Mountains.58 
 
Manie Botha advanced towards the German position at Otavifontein while Lukin was 
deployed to the eastern flank of the Elefantenberg range.59 Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel 
SW Pijper was ordered to attack the western flank of the German position.60 The Germans 
had 3 372 soldiers with 36 artillery pieces and 22 machineguns at Otavifontein which was 
not effectively brought to bear on the Union’s 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades.61 Ritter 
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withdrew following the Union’s artillery bombardment, however the South African horses 
were in no state for a rapid pursuit given that they had marched throughout the night to 
arrive at Otavifontein and give battle. The Germans executed a fighting withdrawal to 
Grootfontein.62 
 
Manie Botha pushed forward through bushy and rugged terrain forcing the German 
commander to withdraw. The German chief-of-staff claimed that had they had the luxury of 
an extra hour to prepare they would have destroyed the Union forces.63 Map 17 indicates the 
action at Otavifontein. 
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Map 17: Action at Otavifontein64  
 
Manie Botha ensured surprise by rushing the German position.65 The casualties for the 
engagement at Otavifontein were ten Germans killed, 25 wounded and 41 taken prisoner,66 
while seven South Africans were wounded and four killed.67 
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While the Germans were moving to Grootfontein, the men of the South African infantry were 
advancing on foot towards Otavifontein. They covered more than 480 kilometres of which 
the last 128 kilometres took only four days. This was a very significant feat and Franke, on 
hearing about this mass movement of infantrymen, commented that it must have been by 
train.68 The distance was in fact not covered by train but by forced march. It is difficult to 
understand the hardship and suffering of the men who were required to undertake the very 
tough forced marches through German South West Africa. Table 2 shows some of the best 
times for forced marches during the campaign.  
  
  Best Forced Marches         
    From To 
distance 
(Km) 
time 
(hours) 
Northern Army 
Left wing 2nd Mounted 
Brigade Husab 
Jakkalswater 
(and back) 122 22 
  5th Mounted Brigade Okaputa Kilo 500 70 18 
  6th Mounted Brigade Omarassa Elefantsnek 58 15 
  
3rd and 5th Mounted 
Brigades Riet Otjimbingue 112 37 
Central Force 
7th, 8th and 9th Mounted 
Brigades Berseba Gibeon 112 72 
Southern 
Force Van Deventer's Column 
Neu 
Khais  Kabus 193 144 
 
Table 2: Best forced marches69 
 
The force under Brits moved on Outjo and was en route to Namutoni towards the end of 
June 1915, while Myburgh was heading for Grootfontein. The wide envelopments were 
designed to cut off the German retreat and encircle the German position.70 The Germans 
had at this stage moved to Khorab where the final stand took place.71 Map 18 indicates the 
final advance and the positions of the South African and German forces. 
 
Myburgh departed on 18 June and moved via Okasisse and Wilhelmstahl, arriving at the 
Waterberg plateau on 26 June 1915. Then on 29 June 1915, Myburgh moved to Otajewita, 
on to Omboamgomde and then to Esere, which he reached on 2 July 1915. During this 
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extensive march there were times when the troops and horses were without water for up to 
two days.72  
 
 
Map 18: The final advance73 
 
Franke had issued a written order (which was found afterwards at Otavifontein) saying 
unequivocally that the time had come for the Germans to give battle. The German 
commander made the point that the defensive strategy followed thus far meant that the 
German fighting force was still intact; it now had to put up a stout defence at the correct time 
and place.74  
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Franke understood the dire position of the German forces. Von Kleist who was protecting the 
German eastern flank saw and reported the commando’s swift movement in the direction of 
Grootfontein. Furthermore, Franke knew that a South African detachment was also 
advancing from the west. With knowledge of the broad South African envelopment, he 
realised only too well that the German position was dire. However, Dr Theodore Seitz, the 
German governor of German South West Africa, was demanding a tactical victory – despite 
Franke’s stated opinion that if it came to a battle the Germans would be annihilated.75 
 
While the South African envelopment was being executed the Germans sought a meeting 
with Botha to discuss terms of surrender. An armistice was arranged but Botha specifically 
excluded the movements of Brits and Myburgh.76 
 
The South African forces received intelligence that the Germans were entrenched at Gaub 
and the right wing of the 3rd Brigade was tasked to envelop the enemy’s rear to the west 
and the 2nd Brigade to the enemy’s rear on the east.77 Myburgh defeated the German force 
at Gaub on 2 July 1915 and then moved to Tsumeb.78  
 
The Union Defence Forces encountered a German force numbering approximately 500 on 4 
July 1915, on the advance to Tsumeb. The German force was subsequently forced to 
withdraw, with the South Africans taking 80 prisoners.79  
 
Myburgh advanced on Tsumeb and after a misunderstanding about the armistice between 
Myburgh’s force and the German force at Tsumeb, an exchange of artillery fire ensued. The 
South African force subsequently entered into negotiations with the Germans at Tsumeb.80 
Franke claimed that Botha had deceived them by deploying his forces during the armistice. 
Botha responded that he had only agreed to an armistice for the local forces in direct contact 
and not for the forces that were busy with enveloping movements.81 The negotiations 
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resulted in the Germans surrendering the town on 6 July 1915.82 At Tsumeb the South 
Africans found stores of weapons and ammunition; apparently the intention was to make 
these available for conducting the Afrikaner Rebellion.83  
 
The Germans at Namutoni surrendered to Brits on 8 July.84 In order to achieve this victory 
Brits had to undertake some extensive and arduous trekking. He departed from Karibib on 
18 June when Myburgh left Okasisse. Brits moved to Etanaho, Omatjenne and Otijasu 
where his troops eventually found potable water. Brits’ force took Ombika on 3 July and 
Okakuejo on 4 July; the next day, on 5 July, Rietfontein was captured. Brits’ brigade covered 
563 kilometres in 13 days, after which Namutoni surrendered.85 
 
The final Union envelopments effectively outmanoeuvred the Germans (refer to Map 19).86 
Ritchie states that the Germans ‘were surrounded before thry knew it. So neat and swift was 
the commander-in-chief’s plan that the German commander was incredulous – until his 
scouts kept coming in and telling him what the real state of affairs was’.87 
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Map 19: The final envelopment88 
 
Botha had virtually no communication with Brits and Myburgh until the envelopments were 
completed on 5 July 1915.89 The bodyguard and the central column moved northwards to 
Otavifontein.  
 
The Germans found themselves facing Botha and the infantry at Otavifontein. Meanwhile 
Myburgh and Brits had cut off their retreat. On 9 July 1915, following negotiations and 
discussions between Botha and Seitz the Germans accepted the conditions of unconditional 
surrender as put forward by Botha.90 The German forces that surrendered at Khorab 
included approximately 4 000 troops and 30 artillery pieces.91 Seitz sent an official letter to 
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the Union Defence Forces to confirm the German surrender; Botha received this at 02:00 on 
9 July.92  
 
The German South West African campaign was the first successful campaign of the First 
World War to be concluded by a dominion of the British Empire. It was also the first armistice 
of the First World War.93 The casualties for the campaign are demonstrated below in Table 
3. 
 
 German South West Africa Afrikaner Rebellion Totals 
Died in action 114 132 246 
Died of other causes  181 181 
Wounded 318 242 560 
Table 3: Casualties in the German South West African campaign and the Afrikaner 
Rebellion94 
 
Analysis of the final envelopment of the German forces with regard to manoeuvre 
warfare theory 
 
The reasons for defeat and victory are complex and they are by their nature inextricably 
intertwined. In order to determine the reasons for victory it is also equally important to 
understand the causes of defeat of a given military force (in this case the German military). 
 
Gooch and Cohen have created a taxonomy for defeat in which the first step is to determine 
the cause of the military failure or defeat. This step is followed by determining the critical 
tasks which led to the defeat, and the third step is to undertake a layered analysis of the 
organisational aspects which led to the failure.95  
 
The reason why the Germans suffered defeat was not that they were outnumbered. They 
were defeated because they did not fight a defensive battle. The German force surrendered 
with their entire fighting force almost intact. 
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The Germans surrendered with 4 740 soldiers, 37 artillery pieces and 22 machineguns. In 
addition, they still had substantial amounts of ammunition that had been stockpiled.96 The 
German and Union forces did not engage in a sustained pitched battle on the tactical level at 
the end of the campaign.  
 
Furthermore, the German forces did not complete several critical tasks during the final 
envelopments. With hindsight they should have engaged in battle at Kalkveld and at 
Otavifontein. Instead the German position at Kalkveld was simply vacated by the German 
forces; no battle was offered. 
 
Botha maintains that the German forces at Kalkveld withdrew because they feared that they 
would be surrounded by the Union Defence Forces. He alludes to the fact that the terrain 
and the circumstances did not allow for an encirclement of the German position at 
Kalkveld.97 
 
The position at Otavifontein was critical to the Union Defence Forces’s route of advance 
because it was an important water source. The German force at Otavifontein was of good 
strength yet they offered virtually no resistance and retreated. Botha mentions that if the 
Union Defence Forces had been unable to capture Otavifontein then the Union forces would 
have been compelled to retreat and regroup.98  
 
Franke had opted for a defensive strategy; he conserved his forces to give battle at the 
critical time and place.99 The letter written by Franke to his forces conveyed the impression 
that a colossal clash between the German and Union forces was imminent. Botha states that 
despite the aggressive tone of Franke’s letter and the fact that the numerically larger 
German force (in comparison to any of the individual advancing South African forces) was 
virtually intact at the end of the campaign, it was evident that the German morale was badly 
shaken.100 Strachan reiterates this in his book, when he writes that the German retreat from 
Otavifontein was a clear indication that their morale had collapsed.101 
 
                                            
96  Strachan, The First World War, 568. 
97  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
98  Ibid. 
99  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Translation of an appeal by Lieutenant Colonel Franke, the commander-in-chief of the 
Protectorate, 28 June 1915. 
100  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South West 
Africa, Despatch number 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
101  Strachan, The First World War, 568. 
113 
Gooch and Handel explain that once the critical failures have been analysed then the 
failures should be compared to the different levels of organisation. The German failure to 
give battle at the required times at Otavifonein and Kalkveld was the result of the shaken 
morale of the German subordinate commanders. Added to this, the German force had no 
previous experience of engaging in this type of campaign.  
 
The Union force’s mobility was something novel and the Germans found themselves 
retreating on a continuous basis. The German military was unfamiliar with facing a rapid, 
highly mobile enemy which targeted its logistical and communication lines. The Germans 
became accustomed to trading space for time. Retreating became an operational procedure. 
The constant withdrawal of the German forces resulted in the forces becoming increasingly 
disconnected with the prospect of an actual pitched defensive battle. The leadership skills of 
Franke and his subordinate commanders must be questioned in this regard. Furthermore it 
should be questioned whether the German force was more acquainted, familiar and 
comfortable with offensive warfare as opposed to a defensive campaign.102 Von Kleist and 
Ritter were perhaps overwhelmed by the magnitude of their commands and their 
responsibilities in the final phase of the campaign. 
 
The Germans appear to have accepted defeat long before the final surrender to the Union 
Defence Forces. The tacit understanding of German sections and detachments to retreat 
may have become an organisational norm which led to the final surrender. 
 
Figure 6 represents the equation that will be applied to the German and Union forces in the 
analysis of the final envelopment in German South West Africa. 
 
Total Military Power = Quantity x Materiel Quality x Non-Material Quality 
Figure 6: Formula for total military power103 
 
In terms of the above formula the ‘quantity’ or numerical strength of the Union forces was 
considerably larger than that of the German forces. The quality of the equipment (the 
materiel) available to the German and Union forces was approximately equal. As the 
campaign progressed the Union Defence Forces controlled the railway which allowed for the 
logistical provisioning of the Union forces (this tilted the scale of materiel towards the Union 
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Defence Forces). The non-material ‘quality’, which refers to issues such as morale, 
motivation, offensive spirit and leadership, was superior within the rank and file of the Union 
Defence Forces than it was in the German force. 
 
The formula shows that the Union forces were stronger than the German forces in number, 
materiel quality and non-material quality. On the point of numerical superiority the Union did 
not have overwhelmingly stronger numbers than the Germans during the final envelopments. 
Botha claims that knowing where the enemy forces were located made it feasible to advance 
with the required number of troops and no more.104 
 
During the last phase of the campaign and the Union Defence Forces’s final envelopments, 
the Germans were on interior lines. The German force was in the central position and it was 
able to concentrate superior forces on any of the separate Union forces that were deployed 
in a forward position.105 Hence the numerical superiority of the Union’s forces was not the 
most decisive factor when the final envelopments were in progress. 
 
What was significant about the South African campaign in German South West Africa was its 
brevity. Handel maintains that qualitative factors are usually the most decisive factors in the 
outcome of a short war.106 In this case the offensive spirit, leadership and morale of the 
Union Defence Forces were crucial in the success of the campaign.  
 
According to Handel, quantitative superiority normally becomes important in extended 
campaigns.107 The brevity of the German South West African campaign is thus testament to 
the strength of the qualitative factors of the Union Defence Forces. The importance of 
numerical superiority is in no way undermined, but the reason for the South African victory 
and the German defeat was not a direct result of numerical strength. If the Germans had 
repulsed the Union forces in the final envelopments, the duration of the campaign would 
have become protracted. In that case the Union Defence Forces’s superior numbers may 
well have influenced the outcome of the campaign in the longer term.  
 
In his official correspondence with the Kaiser, Seitz claims that the German defeat was 
caused by the superior numbers of the Union Defence Forces which had encircled them at 
Khorab by taking the German positions at Namutoni and Tsumeb. Seitz maintains that every 
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attempt to break through the Union encirclement proved futile.108 The dissertation argues 
that the Germans had the option to give battle before the final surrender.  
 
Botha gives the reason for the Union victory as the effect of surprise on the German force 
due to the speed of the enveloping attacks on the German positions at Tsumeb and 
Namutoni.109 The collapse of morale in the German ranks was central to their defeat. The 
numerical superiority of the Union was an important factor but can be regarded as an 
oversimplification of the complex phenomenon of military failure and defeat. 
 
The significance of the campaign is often related to its brevity. This dissertation links the 
short duration of the campaign to the qualitative factors evident in the Union Defence 
Forces; these are in turn analysed in terms of manoeuvre warfare theory. The final 
envelopments resulted in the dislocation of the physical and psychological dimensions of the 
German commanders. The low morale and lack of offensive spirit and cohesion of the 
German force led to their surrender without suffering substantial physical harm. The 
surrender of a military force without physical resistance indicates that they were compelled 
to do so by psychological pressure and the perceived threat of death or destruction. 
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 CHAPTER 9: ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN 
 
Botha and Smuts and the Union Defence Forces staff section had to determine whether 
Windhoek, as the capital of the colony, or the headquarters of the Schutztruppe was the 
centre of gravity of the German force. It became evident that the German centre of gravity 
was not their capital, because when Windhoek was taken the German force merely retreated 
with as much of their equipment and stores as possible. The centre of gravity was the 
Schutztruppe headquarters. A specific headquarters is typically a centre of gravity.1 The 
Schutztruppe headquarters moved from Windhoek to Khorab as the South African forces 
advanced systematically throughout the colony. 
 
The Union forces made use of external lines of communication to advance on the German 
centre of gravity. The logistical question on the movement and supply of the Union Defence 
Forces over vast distances without infrastructure was a key consideration in the campaign.  
 
Operational pauses versus culmination 
 
In order to secure victory a given force should maintain the initiative and exploit the lines of 
communication of the opposing force. In doing so the exploiting force, the attacker, risks 
reaching culmination.2 There is a state of culmination for the attacker and the defender.  
 
For the attacker, culmination is reached when the combat power used to engage and pursue 
the enemy runs out. The culmination point for the defender is reached where the defender 
can no longer defend and counterattack successfully.3 The state of culmination should be 
avoided at all costs. The rapid advances of the South African forces led to various 
operational pauses to prevent culmination.  
 
Clausewitz mentions the loss of morale as one of the critical factors in losing the tactical 
initiative and reaching the culminating point where the spirit of the mass is broken.4 The 
German force culminated in that their fighting spirit was broken.  
 
The South African forces avoided culmination by waiting for supplies and preparing for their 
final advance on the German forces. During an operational pause a given military force is 
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naturally on the defensive. On this Sun states that a defensive stance allows for security 
against defeat; however, in his opinion victory can only be achieved on the offensive.5  
 
The campaign in German South West Africa was characterised by swift advances followed 
by operational pauses which were used to consolidate the space covered. The Northern 
Army paused from 20 March until the end of April 1915 so as to convey the necessary 
supplies to the front. The Union Defence Forces was in the field for 133 days of which only 
24 days were spent on the move.6 The 24 days when the forces were executing operational 
movements were offset by 109 days of operational pause.  
 
Ordinary and extraordinary forces 
 
Leonhard argues that ‘operational planners must determine how to use the available combat 
power to achieve the goals of a campaign’.7 Botha made efficient use of the South African 
commandos and mounted infantry with their high mobility while the regular infantry was used 
to take and hold ground. 
 
The extraordinary and ordinary forces as mentioned by Sun allude respectively to a highly 
mobile force used to execute envelopments; and an ordinary force used to take and hold 
ground.8 Sun states that rapidity is the quintessence of war; it should be applied to take 
advantage of the enemy’s lack of preparation and achieved by taking unexpected routes.9  
 
The Union forces comprised the ordinary and extraordinary components as mentioned by 
Sun but these components had their own South African uniqueness. The extraordinary 
forces were the mobile commandos and mounted infantry, while the regular infantry formed 
the ordinary component. The ordinary force holds ground and forms the hinge which 
supports the mobile forces which in turn creates leverage.10 The infantry provided the hinge 
on which the commandos swung.11  
 
Botha understood the importance of mobility and surprise as the most important 
consideration on the tactical and strategic level.12 Botha’s emphasis on mobility was vividly 
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demonstrated by the UDF strength return in December 1914, which indicated some 33 308 
mounted soldiers.13 Botha further attributed the German surrender to the surprise which was 
affected by the rapid final envelopments.14 
 
For the most part, the commandos formed the extraordinary component of the Union 
Defence Forces. Collyer is of the opinion that without an understanding of the special 
characteristics of the commandos, it is difficult to understand the significance of their 
contribution to the German South West African campaign.15 He feels that the campaign was 
strategic because it comprised wide movements that were designed to defeat the German 
force.16  
 
The commandos were independent in thought and impatient of any formal means of control. 
The members of commandos were astute and relied on their tactical sense and their rifles as 
a means of protection.17 Together, the Boer, his horse and his rifle had become part of 
South African military history and this was passed down from father to son as part of the 
Afrikaner tradition. The result was a combatant who could deliver accurate and economical 
fire and could cross almost any kind of terrain.18  
 
The horses used in the commandos were trained to gallop while the riders fired from the 
saddle – or to stand while their riders dismounted to fire.19 The commandos had their own 
doctrine which had evolved from their history and experience of war. Doctrine combines 
ideology, national culture, technology and the grouping’s formative experiences.20 
 
During the South African War the commandos had no communication lines; they simply 
moved over extended distances without any formal re-supply arrangements.21 The methods 
employed by the commandos sometimes led to confusion and frustration during the German 
South West African campaign. At times Collyer was frustrated by the commando scouts and 
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their commandants who were reluctant to give feedback and information. The members of 
commandos did not always recognise that they were part of a combined fighting force.22  
 
Bezuidenhout’s actions at Riet are a case in point. He led the envelopment at Riet and was 
ordered to move through a gap in the mountain range. However, the gap shown on the map 
was a topographical error – it did not exist and Bezuidenhout was forced to turn back. On his 
return he failed to inform Botha or Collyer that he was unable to envelop the German 
position. This shows that British military traditions of formal channels of reporting and 
command were difficult to align with the unorthodox approach of the commandos.23 
 
The commandos traditionally relied on the horse and rifle in defence and for hunting and the 
burghers were accustomed to use cover and deliver accurate fire.24 They acted by instinct 
more than by command. Their tactics were normally discussed the night before an advance 
or attack in a democratic fashion once the scouting information was received.25  
 
Commandos would assume a formation according to the terrain and the tactical situation. If 
they were fired upon they would take cover as if they were ordered to do so. There were no 
orders needed for a night march because commando members instinctively saddled up and 
set off. Furthermore the hardy lifestyle that the commandos could endure was an asset that 
ensured their mobility.26 As Sun put it, ‘manoeuvring with a flying column is faster than with 
the entire army, however the flying column must sacrifice baggage and stores’.27 
 
The commandos deployed with a minimum of supplies. They used the same tactics that they 
used against the British in the South African War,28 although with superior numbers in the 
German South West African campaign.29  
 
The Germans were amazed by the commando’s methods of advance and attack. They 
‘marched on the cannon thunder’ – a reference to the fact that when the advance scouts 
drew fire from the German rearguard actions, the firing would attract other commando scouts 
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who would promptly join the action.30 Furthermore, the commandos expected their 
commanders to lead from the front.31 
 
Line of least expectation and resistance 
 
The German South West African campaign illustrated some of the essential psychological 
aspects necessary to execute manoeuvre warfare. The movement of the South African 
forces communicated enough of a threat to the German force to deflate their morale and sap 
their will to fight. Morale is essential to the attainment of victory in battle.32 
  
Two maxims of fundamental importance are that an advance or attack should be along the 
line of least resistance; and the line of least expectation. These deal with the physical and 
psychological aspects of warfare respectively. The line of least resistance typically refers to 
geographical and tactical considerations, while the line of least expectation is linked to 
surprise.  
 
In terms of the line of least resistance, German South West Africa had natural obstacles 
such as the desert (and by implication the lack of water supplies) which were deterrents to 
the movement of the Union’s forces. Rayner and O’Shaughnessy explain that ‘the Germans 
said that the 80 mile (128 kilometre) stretch of Namib Desert separating Lüderitzbucht from 
the inland and its comparatively fertile plateau which begins at Aus … plus their own 
valuable assistance, would bring about our annihilation’.33  
 
The Official History states that the Germans believed their position to be secure because of 
the natural advantages (as far as they were concerned) of the terrain and the lack of water 
available to the advancing South African force.34 However, Jomini cautions that remoteness 
will not necessarily protect a country from invasion.35 This was the case in the German 
South West African campaign, where the Germans believed that the terrain was impassable 
from all sides.36 Given that the Germans perceived the terrain as impassable, the rapid 
advance of the Union forces might well have surprised the enemy.  
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Moral surprise refers to a situation where the enemy does not know that you are advancing. 
Material surprise differs in that the enemy is aware that that you are coming but cannot do 
anything about it.37 In both cases, the element of surprise could result in the dislocation of 
the mind of the commander. Psychological dislocation occurs as a result of physical 
dislocation due to supply lines being cut or threatened, or being forced to change front.38  
 
The final envelopments in the German South West African campaign surprised the German 
force and it was overwhelmed. German staff officers underestimated the mobility of the 
Union Defence Forces.39 As Du Picq puts it, the ‘surprised adversary does not defend 
himself, [but instead] he tries to flee’.40 An army that is surprised cannot make effective use 
of its resources.41 The German force surrendered with its entire fighting force virtually intact. 
 
Surprise was dependent on the mobility of the South African forces.42 This mobility was in 
turn dependent on its logistical support. The provision of transport and supplies was 
essential to ensure the mobility of the commandos, which in turn ensured surprise.  
 
In terms of the line of least resistance and expectation, Liddell Hart maintains that a 
dispersed advance could have a single objective, a number of successive objectives or 
alternatively, it could have simultaneous objectives.43  
 
The dispersed advance in German South West Africa took on successive objectives, 
applying pressure on the German force from the north, south and the southeast of the 
colony. The advances and envelopments from the divergent axes of advance attacked the 
physical and psychological dimensions of the German force. The envelopments of the Union 
Defence Forces were applied on the tactical and operational levels of war and they had a 
strategic objective in mind.  
 
The many forced marches and extensive sweeping envelopments forced the Germans to 
retreat because their logistical and communication lines were constantly threatened. Jomini 
explains that manoeuvre and outflanking movements can be used to dislodge the enemy or 
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turn its position.44 An attack on the opposing force’s lines of communication has a huge 
psychological impact by creating a lack of control.45  
 
Decentralised forces 
 
Fuller maintains that a manoeuvre force requires a general who has exceptional initiative 
and a minimal command staff.46 The German South West African campaign mirrored this in 
the methods used by Botha and Smuts; they emphasised doing their own reconnaissance 
and applying decentralised command at all times.  
 
A decentralised command system allows subordinate commanders control over how they 
wish to achieve the required objectives within the framework of the commander’s intent. Only 
a decentralised military force allows for a fast OODA cycle.47 A case in point is that Botha 
deployed his forces without there being interactive contact between them.48 Thus the Official 
History is of the opinion that, ‘manoeuvre control would have been impossible if it was not for 
the commando influence’.49  
 
Some theorists maintain that the command decision has to take place at the lowest tactical 
level for manoeuvre theory to be effective.50 The commander’s intent forms the decision 
making framework of subordinate commanders whether on the operational or tactical level.51 
Botha states that he trusted the leadership and initiative of Myburgh and Brits to execute the 
final envelopments which led to the surrender of the German forces.52 The decentralised 
approach affords subordinate commanders the opportunity to use their initiative but the 
overall commander must allow room for them to make mistakes.53  
 
Botha had a keen military mind and was a talented leader. He studied the activities of British 
Army in the South African War and took note of their mistakes. He understood the relative 
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difference of the speed of march of the infantry as opposed to the cavalry. There were not 
many of the commandants who appreciated this.54  
 
Whittal is of the opinion that ‘the chances that were taken by Botha’s forces were harrowing 
for any officer not trained in the guerrilla school of war. For example Manie Botha and 
Myburgh marched over 160 kilometres through waterless country to cut the German 
railway’.55 This is an example of decentralised command being part of the commander’s 
intent and what the Official History describes as ‘manoeuvre control’. 
 
Manoeuvre forces should be decentralised and they should employ a ‘command by 
influence’ system where the commanders are highly trusted and respected and also have a 
great hold over their subordinates.56 Botha certainly fulfilled the requirement of ‘command by 
influence’. Whittal describes him as, ‘a charismatic leader with a directness and a personal 
magnetism that inspires men’.57   
 
Furthermore the command by influence system filtered down to the lower levels. The 
commando scouts were often named after their leader, for example Bezuidenhout’s 
Scouts.58 The recruitment of commandants was often based on their strength of personality 
and influence.59  
 
All the South African senior officers were veterans of the South African War and were 
personally selected by Botha.60 The selection of suitable subordinate commanders is 
essential if the overall commander applies decentralised command.  
 
Decisive points and the German centre of gravity 
 
Decisive points are defined as positions in time and space which can threaten the centre of 
gravity; where lines of operations join decisive points and centres of gravity.61 The Union 
Defence Forces advanced on Riet, Karibib, Windhoek and Tsumeb. These positions were 
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decisive points on the line of operations to the German centre of gravity which was the 
headquarters of the Schutztruppe. 
 
In terms of the line of operations in the north of German South West Africa, Karibib was a 
decisive point. Karibib was an intermediate objective and part of the plan to capture 
Windhoek.62 The advance on Karibib involved the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Mounted Brigades 
who advanced on Otjimbingwe and Okahandja while the 4th Infantry Brigade advanced at a 
slower pace on Kubas and Karibib.63 The Infantry Brigade formed the ordinary force (as 
mentioned by Sun) and the extraordinary force was made up of the Mounted Brigades. 
 
The capture of Windhoek and Karibib allowed for the neutralising of the German use of the 
railway and with that, their ability to concentrate forces on the Union Defence Forces within 
the broader German South West Africa.64 The objective of Karibib effectively severed the 
German lines of communication because it was a central railway junction.65 The Union’s 
capture of Karibib meant that the Germans no longer had many options in terms of taking 
the initiative.66 
 
Following the capture of Karibib, taking Windhoek was a mere formality. Collyer describes 
Windhoek as a decisive point because its capture resulted in the withdrawal of the German 
forces to the north.67 Windhoek was a limited objective of the advance, but it was not the 
German centre of gravity. Collyer is of the opinion that the value of Windhoek in terms of its 
impact on the Germans was purely sentimental.68 The line of operations in the north led the 
Union Defence Forces to take Riet, Karibib, and Windhoek as decisive points en route to the 
Schutztruppe headquarters.  
 
The logistical supply of the Union Defence Forces was the greatest limiting factor for the 
enveloping and outmanoeuvring of the final German position. Botha only kept the mobile 
forces and infantry units required to execute the final envelopment.   
 
The final envelopment of the German positions involved both ordinary and extraordinary 
forces. The extraordinary force comprised the Mounted Brigades under the command of 
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Brits and Myburgh; the ordinary force was made up of the 6th and 1st Infantry Brigades 
under Lukin and Beves respectively.  
 
The final surrender was a close cut decision when analysed with the advantage of hindsight. 
The mass of the Union’s forces were at Otavifontein and the rations were running extremely 
thin. The lines of communication were overextended and the South Africans were counting 
on forcing the Germans to surrender. 
 
The German force was still physically able to give battle; however the manoeuvres of the 
Union Defence Forces had dislocated Franke and his subordinate commanders and 
psychologically weakened the German force. The Germans thus chose not to give battle 
because of their low morale and weakened psychological state. 
 
A quick decision in war, operations and or battle indicates a slow decision making process 
by the defeated army.69 The decisive outcome was thus evidence of a slow decision making 
cycle by the German forces. They were dislocated on the operational level. Their physical 
and psychological spheres were compromised by being surrounded and cut off. A feeling of 
helplessness ensues when a force is outmanoeuvred; when the psychological dimension is 
negatively influenced to the point where it loses its will to fight.70 The Germans surrendered 
in their final position without firing a single shot. The German force was pre-empted on the 
tactical level because they surrendered without fighting which was a likely result of the 
dislocation on the operational level. 
 
Botha commented to Buxton that the final result might well have been more difficult to 
achieve had the Germans put up more of a fight in their final position. Their defensive 
position was very strong and it had artillery and machine gun support.71 Because they did 
not have the will to engage in a defensive battle, they opted for a quick decision and 
immediate German surrender. 
 
Numerical superiority versus manoeuvre warfare 
 
The divergent lines of advance into German South West Africa using external lines of 
operations required a reasonably large force on the four divergent axes. The logistical needs 
of the advancing forces also had to be met. The divergent lines of advance had a paralysing 
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effect on the German force. So much so that it is probably safe to presume that if the Union 
Defence Forces had deployed a far smaller force on each axis of advance it would still have 
gained a similar result.  
 
The South African force that enveloped the German force’s final position comprised less 
than 5 000 soldiers. These soldiers were divided into three force groupings. The German 
force was numerically equal to the Union force that participated in the final envelopments. 
Furthermore the German force held the central position and could have concentrated 
superior forces on any of the separate advancing Union forces.  
 
The numerical superiority of the Union Defence Forces facilitated the taking and holding of 
ground. The lines of communication were secured by the infantry. The large number of 
commandos allowed the Union forces to pursue different lines of advance while ensuring 
mobility and rapidity. Although the importance of numbers cannot be underestimated, the 
decisive factor in the operational and strategic success points towards manoeuvre theory 
and Botha’s innate understanding of its attributes. Donn Starry, former United States general 
and originator of the so-called AirLand Battle doctrine,72 states that within reasonable limits it 
does not matter if the enemy is outnumbered.73  
 
The hypothesis addresses the issue of whether the German South West African campaign 
was won by numerical superiority or whether it was the application of manoeuvre warfare 
theory that compelled the Germans to surrender. Leonhard expands on the issue of 
numerical superiority by stating, ‘the commander who pre-empts the enemy may be 
numerically stronger or weaker than his foe and his weapons may be better or worse ... if the 
commander’s decisive approach to the conflict is overwhelmingly superior’.74   
 
This concept refers back to the intention and the mindset of the commander and the way the 
forces are used. Pre-emption is the threat of force communicated by the use of mobile forces 
so as to induce the enemy to surrender or prevent the enemy’s intended action.75  
 
The analysis of the final envelopments in Chapter 8 determined that the reason why the 
German forces were defeated was that they did not put up defensive battles at the required 
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time and place. Instead of taking a stand, the German forces chose to retreat time and again 
– which was indicative of low morale and poor combat cohesion. 
 
When the morale of the attacking force is higher than that of the defending force, entrenched 
troops are inclined to give way and flee.76 The morale of the conquerors will then increase 
and the defeated force will experience a dip in their morale.77 The analysis section of 
Chapter 8 also determined that in the Union Defence Forces qualitative factors such as 
morale, leadership and offensive spirit were strong and that these were fundamental to the 
rapid decision of the Union Defence Forces and the German surrender. The significance of 
the campaign was its brevity. Qualitative factors usually lead to rapidly concluded military 
campaigns or successes.  
 
The drop in morale in German ranks was responsible for their lack of fighting spirit which in 
turn was caused by the Union Defence Forces’s application of mobile warfare which 
emphasised enveloping action. Therefore the Union Defence Forces’s operational strategy 
and tactics induced the German surrender by neutralising their will to fight and collapsing 
their morale. 
 
The numerical superiority of the Union Defence Forces did not result in the final surrender of 
the German forces. It is protracted campaigns that are usually won by numerical superiority. 
The brevity of the campaign is thus significant and is associated with the qualitative 
elements evident in the Union Defence Forces. If the German forces had repulsed the Union 
Defence Forces by means of a stout and spirited defensive battle, then over time one could 
reasonably assume that the numerical superiority of the Union Defence Forces would 
eventually have won the campaign. The essential difference between these two scenarios is 
the time taken to achieve the military victory. 
 
Sun maintains that ‘the victorious strategist seeks battle after the victory78 has been won’.79 
Clausewitz is of the opinion that ‘if a detachment is sent away to cut off the retreat of a 
fleeing enemy, and the enemy surrenders in consequence without further resistance, still it is 
through the combat which is offered to him by this detachment sent after him that he is 
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brought to his decision’.80 The final envelopments of the German positions resulted in the 
defeat of the German forces. 
 
The final positioning of forces made the situation untenable for the Germans and their 
surrender was inevitable. Manoeuvre theory holds that mobility is more important that 
firepower, but that certain elements of the opposing force will have to be destroyed; and 
following that the eventual positioning of forces will induce defeat with the threat of 
annihilation.81 This positioning of forces fulfils the psychological and physical requirements of 
dislocation of the enemy. When you surround a foe – leave an outlet free.82 This does not 
have to be physical but can be the option of surrender.  
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 CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation analyses the German South West African campaign in the First World War 
with reference to the modern theory of manoeuvre warfare. The dissertation’s hypothesis 
questions whether the campaign was won because of numerical superiority or whether 
success was a consequence of the application of manoeuvre warfare theory.  
 
The topic is introduced and the literature review is addressed in Chapters 1 and 2 
respectively. Chapter 3 discusses the framework of manoeuvre warfare theory. Chapters 4 
to 8 provide an account and analysis of the campaign addressing the course of events. 
Chapter 9 then analyses the entire campaign with reference to the manoeuvre warfare 
theory framework.  
 
One of the central figures in this campaign was Louis Botha, the prime minister of the Union 
of South Africa and the commander-in-chief of the Union’s expeditionary force in German 
South West Africa. Botha met all the classical requirements of a great commander, including 
decisiveness, ingenuity, power of personality and charisma, which enabled him to motivate 
his troops. In terms of the operational strategy in the German South West African campaign 
he displayed an understanding of the complexities of the campaign which included logistical 
considerations and the limitations and capabilities of the commandos, the mounted infantry 
and the regular infantry.  
 
Trew is of the opinion that Botha’s campaign was that of a genius in the art of war. He goes 
on to question whether future historians will rate him as one of the great commanders of the 
past.1 Collyer argues that there are not many strategists who had Botha’s tactical ability and 
strategic insight.2 Reflecting on Botha’s military background, Whittall claims that ‘his elastic 
military training allowed for the accomplishment of the campaign’.3 Botha was a man of his 
time with a distinct vision in terms of military strategy. His war experience and insight into 
military operations made him the ideal commander for the campaign in German South West 
Africa considering the forces he had at his disposal. 
 
Botha employed a strategy in German South West Africa that was congruent with those 
executed by the great captains of war throughout history. The decisive campaign he led was 
the first successful campaign of the First World War to be concluded by a dominion of the 
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British Empire. The campaign induced the surrender of the German forces without extensive 
loss of life or materiel.  
 
Despite Botha’s abilities there were also other factors that contributed to the defeat of the 
Germans, such as their inability to put up a strong defence at critical times due to the 
collapse of their morale. The German force’s reluctance to engage in battle is perhaps also 
related to organisational aspects such as their lack of defensive campaign experience when 
faced by a rapidly advancing and determined enemy.  
 
The collapse in German morale was caused by the operations conducted by the Union 
Defence Forces which emphasised rapid attacks and envelopments. The final confrontation 
between the German and Union forces was one of equal numerical strength where the 
Germans possessed superior materiel such as artillery pieces and machineguns. The 
German force also held the central position during the final envelopments whereas the Union 
forces were divided into three main detachments. The German force could thus have 
concentrated superior numbers on any of the Union’s enveloping forces during the last 
phase of the campaign. This makes it clear that numerical superiority was not a pivotal factor 
in the rapid decision and German surrender.  
 
Numerical superiority should however not be underestimated because it gave the Union 
Defence Forces an advantage in the securing of communication lines which were essential 
for the campaign. The numerical superiority of the Union Defence Forces also allowed for a 
four-pronged advance on divergent axes. However, the effective culmination of the German 
forces was brought about by the application of highly mobile troops which resulted in the 
dislocation of the physical and mental dimensions of the German forces and thereby 
ensured their surrender. 
 
Liddell Hart argues that the psychological and physical dislocation of the enemy on a 
continuous basis requires the advancing force to change its lines of operations through 
divergent advances on a central objective or through divergent advances on successive 
decisive points en route to the centre of gravity.4 This was the case in German South West 
Africa where the Union Defence Forces had a northern and southern offensive which were 
directed at the headquarters of the Schutztruppe, their the centre of gravity.  
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The four-pronged advance of the Union Defence Forces forces fulfils the requirement of 
divergent advances on the German centre of gravity. It completes the requirement of 
working on external lines of operations and the objectives and decisive points were 
successive in leading to the Schutztruppe headquarters.   
 
The mobility of the commandos ensured tactical and operational surprise resulting in quick 
decisive outcomes. The operation was designed as a quick, decisive campaign of 
manoeuvre.5 The Official History states that the German South West African campaign is an 
example of one of the most clear cut campaigns in history.6 Lord Buxton described the 
campaign – which effectively took six months – as ‘no small feat in a country of vast 
distances, deficiency of water, heavy and dry sand, and hot and dusty marching’.7  
 
                                            
5  Dane, British Campaigns in Africa and the Pacific 1914–1918, 32. 
6  Anon., Official History, 3. 
7  Meintjes, General Louis Botha, 269. 
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